

Epoka University

Introduction to International Security (PIR 132)

A Reader

By  
Dr. Islam Jusufi

Epoka University  
Department of Political Science and International Relations  
Tirana, February 2018

## **Contents**

Preface .....	3
Lecturer .....	4
Assignments.....	5
Syllabus and Slides .....	6

## **Preface**

This Reader brings together materials related to the International Security. More specifically, it is related with the materials on the course “Introduction to International Relations” (PIR 132), taught at Bachelor program in the Political Science and International Relations at Epoka University.

## **Lecturer**

Dr. Islam Jusufi,  
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E-mail: [ijusufi@epoka.edu.al](mailto:ijusufi@epoka.edu.al).  
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Personal website: <http://ijusufi.epoka.edu.al>.

Islam Jusufi, PhD: Lecturer and Head at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations at Epoka University, Tirana, Albania. Studied Politics at University of Sheffield and International Relations at Universities of Amsterdam, Bilkent and Ankara. He held fellowships at the Wilson Centre, Washington DC; EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris; ERSTE Stiftung, Vienna; UNESCO, Paris; Centre for Policy Studies, Budapest; and NATO, Brussels. His research interests relate to international, European and Balkan politics and security studies.

## Assignments

Essay (value: 10%): Each student will prepare an Essay. It should be: a. original, b. related to a topic covered in the course, and c. applied to Albania. Deadline for delivery of Essay (two days before the start of the mid-term exam week). Essays should be between 800-1000 words, uploaded to Turnitin.

Presentations (value: 10%): After the mid-term exam period, students will present their essays. All presentations will be presented in seminar format. No power point. 10 minutes of oral presentation.

### Evaluation format for Essays:

Name of student	Content (out of 50 points)	Organization (out of 10 points)	Mechanics - Language (out of 10 points)	Citations and References (out of 10 points)	Style of writing (out of 10 points)	Format (out of 10 points)	TOTAL (100 points)

### Evaluation format for Oral Presentations:

Category	Scoring Criteria	Total Points	Score
<b>Organization (10 points)</b>	The type of presentation is appropriate for the topic and audience.	5	
	Information is presented in a logical sequence.	5	
<b>Content (45 points)</b>	Introduction is attention-getting, lays out the problem well, and establishes a framework for the rest of the presentation.	5	
	Technical terms are well-defined in language appropriate for the target audience.	5	
	Presentation contains accurate information.	10	
	Material included is relevant to the overall message/purpose.	10	
	Appropriate amount of material is prepared, and points made reflect well their relative importance.	10	
	There is an obvious conclusion summarizing the presentation.	5	
<b>Presentation (45 points)</b>	Speaker maintains good eye contact with the audience and is appropriately animated (e.g., gestures, moving around, etc.).	5	
	Speaker uses a clear, audible voice.	5	
	Delivery is poised, controlled, and smooth.	5	
	Good language skills and pronunciation are used.	10	
	Visual aids (if not visual aids), the posture is effective, and not distracting.	5	
	Length of presentation is within the assigned time limits.	5	
	Information was well communicated.	10	
<b>Score</b>	<b>Total Points</b>	<b>100</b>	

## **Syllabus and Slides**

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**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**COURSE SYLLABUS**

COURSE INFORMATION							
Course Title: Introduction to International Security							
Code	Course Type	Regular Semester	Lecture	Recit.	Lab.	Credits	ECTS
PIR 132	B	2	3	0	-	3	5
Lecturer and Office Hours			Dr. Islam Jusufi ( <a href="mailto:ijusufi@epoka.edu.al">ijusufi@epoka.edu.al</a> ), E-building				
Teaching Assistants and Office Hours			Ms. Ajsela Toci ( <a href="mailto:atoci14@epoka.edu.al">atoci14@epoka.edu.al</a> ), E-building				
Language			English				
Compulsory/Elective			Main				
Classroom and Meeting Time							
Description	This is an introductory course on the study of international security. This course is a core course and provides a general introduction to the field of security studies. The course will introduce students to different types of security concepts and actors.						
Objectives	The goal of this course is to enable students to understand conceptual approaches and major issues in the study of international security. It aims to introduce students to the field of international security and familiarise them with basic ideas about it. The course also aims to develop key academic writing skills and equip students with a range of important skills; managing a varied workload; and preparing written reports and verbal presentations. Through integrating major international security concepts with security issues, this course will help students deepen their understandings on the current security challenges.						
COURSE OUTLINE							
Weekly lessons	Topics						
1	<b>a. Course introduction, overview of texts, and expectations</b> <b>b. Introduction to Security Studies</b>  <u>Must readings:</u> Williams, pages: 1-10.  <u>Optional:</u> Buzan, pages: 21-45.						
2	<b>War</b>  <u>Must readings:</u> Williams, pages: 151-169.  <u>Optional:</u> Kalyvas, pages: 16-31. Film: Na Wewe.						
3	<b>Ethnic conflict</b>  <u>Must readings:</u> Williams, pages: 200-215.  <u>Optional:</u> Lake, pages: 41-75.						
4	<b>State Failure</b>  <u>Must readings:</u> Bates, pages: 6-12; 15-29.						

**EPOKA UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**COURSE SYLLABUS**

	<p><u>Optional:</u>  Bates, pages: 97-139.  Atzili, pages: 139-154.</p>
<b>5</b>	<p><b>Armed Groups</b></p> <p><u>Must readings:</u>  Marten, pages: 41-73.</p> <p><u>Optional:</u>  Bryden, pages: 23-38.</p>
<b>6</b>	<p><b>Terrorism</b></p> <p><u>Must readings:</u>  Williams, pages: 171-184</p> <p><u>Optional:</u>  Williams, pages: 376-388.</p>
<b>7</b>	<p><b>Cyber Security</b></p> <p><u>Must readings:</u>  Libicki, pages: 11-37.</p> <p><u>Optional:</u>  Cavelty (Cyber Security), pages: 1-23; 138-144.  Cavelty (Power and Security), pages: ix-xiv; 1-12; 151-160.  Hansen, pages: 1155-1175.</p>
<b>8</b>	<p><b>Sectoral security: energy security, environmental security</b></p> <p><u>Must readings:</u>  Williams, pages: 483-496.</p> <p><u>Optional:</u>  Buzan, pages: 71-92.</p>
<b>9</b>	<p><b>Human and Societal Security</b></p> <p><u>Must readings:</u>  Williams, pages: 229-243.</p> <p><u>Optional:</u>  Buzan, pages: 119-139.</p>
<b>10</b>	<p><b>Alliances and Regional security institutions</b></p> <p><u>Must readings:</u>  Williams, pages: 291-323.</p>
<b>11</b>	<p><b>Peace studies and Peace operations</b></p> <p><u>Must readings:</u>  Williams, pages: 73-88.</p> <p><u>Optional:</u>  Williams, pages: 407-420.</p>



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**FACULTY OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**COURSE SYLLABUS**

<b>12</b>	<b>Organized crime and Migration</b>  <u>Must readings:</u> Williams, pages: 453-482.
<b>13</b>	<b>Arms trade, Nuclear proliferation, Private security</b>  <u>Must readings:</u> Williams, pages: 345-374.  <u>Optional:</u> Williams, pages: 438-451.
	<b>MID-TERM EXAM</b> (is held in one of the weeks in the middle of the semester)
	<b>FINAL EXAM</b> (is held in the weeks of 15-16 of the semester)
<b>Prerequisite(s)</b>	Class attendance and participation; essay and presentations; class discussions.
<b>Textbook</b>	<u>Must readings:</u>  Bates, R. (2008). <i>When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa</i> . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. (Available Online)  Libicki, M. C. (2009). <i>Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar</i> . Santa Monica: RAND. (Available Online)  Marten, K. Z. (2006/7). Warlordism in Comparative Perspective. <i>International Security</i> , 3. (Available Online)  Williams, P. D. (2008). <i>Security Studies: An Introduction</i> . London: Routledge. (Available Online)
<b>Other References</b>	<u>Optional:</u>  Atzili, B. (2006/7, Winter). When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict. <i>International Security</i> , 3, 139-173. (Available Online)  Bryden, A. & Caparini, M. (2006). <i>Private Actors and Security Governance</i> . Geneva: DCAF. (Available Online)  Buzan, B., Wæver O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). <i>Security: A New Framework for Analysis</i> . London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. (Available with the lecturer)  Cavelty, M. D. (2008). <i>Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age</i> . London: Routledge. (Available Online)  Cavelty, M. D., Mauer, V. & Krishna-Hensel, S. F. (2008). <i>Power and Security in the Information Age</i> . Abingdon: Routledge. (Available Online)  Hansen, L. & Nissenbaum, H. (2009). Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the

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**FACULTY OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**COURSE SYLLABUS**

	<p>Copenhagen School. <i>International Studies Quarterly</i>, 4, 1155-1175. (Available Online)</p> <p>Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). <i>The Logic of Violence in Civil War</i>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Available Online)</p> <p>Lake, D. A. &amp; Rothchild, D. (1996, Fall). Containing Fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict. <i>International Security</i>, 2, 41-75. (Available Online)</p> <p>Film: Na Wewe. (Available Online)</p>	
Laboratory Work	-	
Computer Usage	No	
Others		
LEARNING OUTCOMES AND COMPETENCIES		
1	To demonstrate a knowledge of major issues and concepts in International Security,	
2	To demonstrate an ability to use these concepts in particular circumstances,	
3	To demonstrate an ability to present an argument in both oral and written forms,	
4	To demonstrate basic understanding of the major security institutions in world politics as well as significant security developments in the world.	
COURSE'S CONTRIBUTION TO PROGRAM OUTCOMES (Blank : no contribution, 1: least contribution ... 5: highest contribution)		
No	Program Learning Outcomes	Cont.
1	Having and using advanced knowledge and comprehension supported by textbooks including actual knowledge in political sciences and international relations literature, materials and the other scientific resources	5
2	Determining complex events and topics, making discussions and developing new suggestions in accordance with researches	5
3	Analyzing data, ideas and concepts of current political issues and international relations	5
4	Having knowledge and thought about actual topics and problems together with their historical, social and cultural aspects	4
5	Gaining IT skills to use computer and technology in order to reach actual knowledge	1
6	Improving skills of working together with the main social science disciplines and other disciplines which are related to Political Science and International Relations	3
7	Improving critical thinking and skills in making research independently	5
8	Developing solutions about the problems and conflicts which are common in national and international arena	5
9	Gaining skills to follow societal, scientific and ethic values during collecting, interpreting, conducting of data related to social and political developments	5
10	Knowing any foreign language enough to communicate with colleagues and understand actual researches and articles	4
11	Introducing those who are interested in politics and international events with the topics of Political Science and IR and teaching clearly the problems and the types of solutions	5
12	Improving skills for leadership and research and analyze capacity of those who is responsible with national and international ones	3

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**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**COURSE SYLLABUS**

13	Having consciousness about human rights and environment	5	
COURSE EVALUATION METHOD			
In-term studies	Quantity	Percentage	
Mid-term exam	1	30	
Essay	1	10	
Presentation of Essay	1	10	
Final Exam	1	40	
Participation	1	10	
Total		100	
Contribution of in-term studies to overall grade		60	
Contribution of final examination to overall grade		40	
Total		100	
ECTS (ALLOCATED BASED ON STUDENT) WORKLOAD			
Activities	Quantity	Duration (Hour)	Total Workload (Hour)
Course Duration (Including the exam week: 16x Total course hours)	16	3	48
Hours for off-the-classroom study (Pre-study, practice)	16	2	32
Assignments	6	1	6
Mid-terms	6	1	6
Final examination	16	1	16
Other	17	1	17
Total Work Load			125
Total Work Load / 25 (h)			5.00
ECTS Credit of the Course			5

# **PIR 132, Introduction to International Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi**  
**Epoka University**

# Issues to cover

## A. Introduction of course.

- Review of course objectives.
- Useful references and reading material.
- Outline of subjects to be covered.
- Assignments.

## B. Weekly lesson.

# Fact sheet

- Course Title: Introduction to International Security, PIR 132.
- Course hours per week: Once a week, for 3 hours per week.
- Weekly lessons: 13 weeks.
- Mid-term: 1 week in the middle of the semester.
- Final exam: in the 15-16 weeks of the semester.
- Assignments: Essay, Presentation of Essay.

# Description and Objectives

- Introductory level course.
- Core course.
- Introduce students to different types of security concepts and actors.
- Understand major issues in international security.
- Deepen understandings on the current security challenges.

# Learning outcomes

- Knowledge on major issues and concepts in International Security.
- Ability to use these concepts in particular circumstances.
- Ability to present an argument in both oral and written forms.
- Understanding of major security institutions in world politics.



# Office hours

- By appointment.
- Students are encouraged to use office hours to discuss readings, exams, and any other matter, including their future professional development.
- Review of individual progress.
- via email: [ijusufi@epoka.edu.al](mailto:ijusufi@epoka.edu.al).
- Office: E-building.
- Assistant: Ajsela Toci ([atoci14@epoka.edu.al](mailto:atoci14@epoka.edu.al)), E-building.

# Readings

- Wide range of sources.
- Must readings and Optional readings.
- Available with the lecturer.
- If students experience any difficulty accessing material, they should contact the instructor or the assistant immediately.

# Must readings

- Bates, R. (2008). When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Libicki, M. C. (2009). Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. Santa Monica: RAND.
- Marten, K. Z. (2006/7). Warlordism in Comparative Perspective. International Security, 3.
- Williams, P. D. (2008). Security Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge.

# Optional readings

- Atzili, B. (2006/7, Winter). When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict. *International Security*, 3, 139-173.
- Bryden, A. & Caparini, M. (2006). *Private Actors and Security Governance*. Geneva: DCAF.
- Buzan, B., Wæver O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

# Optional readings - 2

- Cavelty, M. D. (2008). Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age. London: Routledge.
- Cavelty, M. D., Mauer, V. & Krishna-Hensel, S. F. (2008). Power and Security in the Information Age. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hansen, L. & Nissenbaum, H. (2009). Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School. *International Studies Quarterly*, 4, 1155-1175.

# Optional readings - 3

- Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lake, D. A. & Rothchild, D. (1996, Fall). Containing Fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict. International Security, 2. 41-75.
- Film: Na Wewe.

# Course Outline, Lessons 1-2

- Lesson 1: a. Course introduction, overview of texts, and expectations; b. **Introduction to Security Studies.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 1-10.

Optional: Buzan, pages: 21-45.

- Lesson 2: **War.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 151-169.

Optional: Kalyvas, pages: 16-31; Film: Na Wewe.

# Lessons 3-4

- Lesson 3: **Ethnic conflict.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 200-215.

Optional: Lake, pages: 41-75.

- Lesson 4: **State Failure.**

Must readings: Bates, pages: 6-12; 15-29.

Optional: Bates, pages: 97-139; Atzili, pages: 139-154.



# Lessons 5-6

- Lesson 5: **Armed Groups.**

Must readings: Marten, pages: 41-73.

Optional: Bryden, pages: 23-38.

- Lesson 6: **Terrorism.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 171-184

Optional: Williams, pages: 376-388.

# Lessons 7

- Lesson 7: **Cyber Security**.

Must readings: Libicki, pages: 11-37.

Optional: Cavelty (Cyber Security), pages: 1-23; 138-144. Cavelty (Power and Security), pages: ix-xiv; 1-12; 151-160. Hansen, pages: 1155-1175.

# Lessons 8-9

- Lesson 8: **Sectoral security: energy security, environmental security.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 483-496.

Optional: Buzan, pages: 71-92.

- Lesson 9: **Human and Societal Security.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 229-243.

- Optional: Buzan, pages: 119-139.

# Lessons 10-11

- Lesson 10: **Alliances and Regional security institutions.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 291-323.

- Lesson 11: **Peace studies and Peace operations.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 73-88.

Optional: Williams, pages: 407-420.

# Lessons 12-13

- Lesson 12: **Organized crime and Migration.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 453-482.

- Lesson 13: **Arms trade, Nuclear proliferation, Private security.**

Must readings: Williams, pages: 345-374.

Optional: Williams, pages: 438-451.

# Evaluation and Assignments

- Mid-term Exam      1      30%.
- Essay                              1      10%
- Presentation                      1      10%.
- Final Exam                              1      40%.
- Participation                              1      10%.

# Evaluation and Assignments - 2

- Mid-term exam (30%): 1 week in the middle of the semester.
- Essay (10%): Each student will prepare an Essay. It should be: a. original, b. related to a topic covered in the course, and c. applied to Albania. Deadline for delivery of Essay (two days before the start of the mid-term exam week). Essays should be between 800-1000 words, uploaded to Turnitin.

# Evaluation and Assignments - 3

- Presentations (10%): Starting from the 1<sup>st</sup> week after the mid-term exam week, students will present their essays. 10 minutes of oral presentation.
- Final Exam: (40%).
- Class Participation (10%): You are expected to read materials. 60% compulsory attendance. Attendance (50%) and participation (50%) in class will be assessed and will figure into final grade.



# **Introduction to Security Studies**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
Epoka University**

# What is security studies?

- Area of inquiry on fundamental questions.
- Security studied starting from ancient times.
- As academic subject, it came to prominence after WWII.
- Important IR subfield; referred as “Security Studies” or “Strategic Studies”.
- No rigid boundaries in security studies as securitization is a continuous process.

# Golden age of security studies

- ‘Golden age’ (1950s-1960s): close connections of civilian strategists with governments.
- Academics provided conceptual innovation, research, and recruits.
- Security analysts were busy designing theories, e.g. nuclear deterrence.

# Tradition approach

- Dominant approach within security studies: realism.
- Preoccupied with four Ss: states, strategy, science, status quo.
- States: as referent objects of security.
- Strategy: military focused/how to employ force.
- Science: Empirical and positivist.
- Status quo: preserve status quo and prevent revolutionary changes.

# Alternative views

- Dissenting voices offered by “peace research” and ‘third world’ studies.
- Buzan and Copenhagen School offered alternative views on at two of four Ss of traditional security studies: Security not just about states; and that it cannot be confined to military force.
- Buzan and Copenhagen School’s widening agenda with five sectors in focus (military, political, economic, societal, environmental).

# Several problems with security studies

- States are not the only actors and important referent objects for security.
- Dominated by Anglo-American men ('for someone and for some purpose').
- Security requires analysis from specific disciplines: nuclear and environmental engineering, psychology, divinity, medicine, biology, chemistry, criminology; studying IR is not enough.

# Four fundamental questions of security studies

- What is security?
- Whose security?
- What counts as a security issue?
- How can security be achieved?

# What is Security?

- Security an important aspect of IR.
- Important pillar of state and international policymaking.
- People pay for their own security.
- States invest for their own survival.
- People are often killed for the sake of survival of the state.



# Definition of Security

- Security as subjective definition; it means what person or state in question says it means.
- It means different things to different people.
- Contested concept.
- Common definition: prevention and alleviation of threats to cherished values; or survival in the face of existential threat.

# Definition of Security - 2

- Security is alleviation of threats to cherished values, especially those that threaten the survival of a particular referent object.
- Although security and survival are related, they are not synonymous.
- Survival: existential condition.
- Security: ability to pursue cherished political and social ambitions.
- Security as 'survival-plus'.

# As political and hierarchical concept

- Political and hierarchical concept.
- Political: Security plays role in deciding who gets what in world politics.
- It seeks to interpret the past, present, and future.
- Struggle over the allocation of resources.
- Hierarchical: It operates hierarchically (rich vs poor) and perpetuates these hierarchies.

# Two prevalent philosophies of security

First philosophy: power-based.

- Security as synonymous with accumulation of power.
- Security as commodity (property, money, weapons).
- Power as route to security: more powerful more secure.

# Two prevalent philosophies of security - 2

- Second philosophy: understood in relational sense.
- Security concerned with justice and human rights (Palme's call for "common security").
- Security as relationship rather than a commodity. E.g. Iran vs India on nuclear regime.
- Security relationships in negative terms (security as absence of something threatening) – "freedom from", or positive terms (phenomena that make things possible) – "freedom to".

# What is international security?

- International security has its own distinctive agenda.
- It is when issue is presented as posing existential threat to a referent object.
- Taking politics beyond established rules.
- Special nature of security threats justifies use of extraordinary measures.

# Whose security?

- Without a referent object there can be no discussion of security.
- Historically, central focus of security has been people.
- Later, academic security was fused with ‘the state’ (‘national security’, ‘state security’), later with other actors’ security.
- Who or what should constitute referent object for security studies?

# Three types of units of security analysis

- Referent objects: things that are threatened and that have legitimate claim for survival (state, nation).
- Securitizing actors: actors who securitize issues.
- Functional actors: actors who influence decisions. E.g. polluting company.



# Five approaches on referent objects in security

1. “State”.
2. “Human beings”: ‘Human security’ - not concerned with weapons, but concerned with human dignity.
3. “Society”: ‘societal security’.

# Five approaches on referent objects in security - 2

4. Level of analysis: lowest level (individual) to collective level (society, state), to international system (world peace and order).
5. Planet Earth: environment as essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.

# Referent objects

- Scale or size matters in order to clarify for referent object.
- “Humanity” considered as referent object when facing nuclear or climate threat.
- “Working class” during socialist times.
- “Democracy”, “Liberal world economies”, “free trade” for liberal world.
- “World peace” for UN.

# Securitizing actor

- Someone who performs security speech act
- Political leaders, bureaucracies, pressure groups.
- When a President is speaking, it is not individual speaking, but the state she/he is representing.
- Collectivity or organizational logic matters.
- In order to be a securitizing actor, you have to be in position to represent a referent object.

# Securitizing actor - 2

Facilitating conditions for successful securitization speech act:

- Security speech act has its own grammar.
- Securitizing actor is in position of authority and is accepted as such by the audience.
- Features of alleged threats help or prevent securitization to happen.

# What is a security issue?

- What is security issue for a referent?
- How threats are constructed?
- Not all threats are of equal political significance.
- Focus on powerful or powerless?

# **UN High-level Panel on Threats (2004), identified six threats**

- Economic-social threats.
- Inter-state conflict.
- Internal conflict.
- Weapons of mass destruction.
- Terrorism.
- Transnational organized crime.

Different states offer different significance to threats, according to their power.

# Other threats

- Military sector: threats to survival of armed forces (leading to coup d'état).
- Political sector: threats to sovereignty or ideology (for states) or to world peace (for international system).
- Economic sector: bankruptcy.
- Societal sector: demographics, identity.
- Environmental sector: species, habitat.



# Securitization

- From non-politicized (not related to state) to politicized (when state interferes) to securitized (issue presented as existential threat, requiring emergency threats).
- Placement varies from one state to another and across time.
- Securitization process can happen by states or by other actors.

# Securitization - 2

- Issues become securitized not only because there is real threat, but also because the issue is presented as such.
- “Discourse” matters in securitization.
- Statement of a threat is *securitization move*. It becomes securitized when it is accepted as such by the public.

# Securitization - 3

- Fear that the other party will not let us survive is motivation for security act.
- Securitization has three components: threats, emergency action, effects on inter-unit relations.
- Quality of security is when an issue is lifted above politics.
- Politicization provides for right of choice, in contrast to securitization which does not recognize right of choice to leaders.

# Institutionalization of security

- In some issues, security has become institutionalized. E.g. Dikes in Holland.
- Institutionalization happens when threats are repetitive.
- As a result of military threats, armed forces are established; as a result of crimes, police forces are established.
- “Black programs” exist due to securitized politics.

# Institutionalization of security - 2

- Climate is not yet securitized as it is new and some contest urgency of climate change.
- Climate change does not have its own home institution; it is dealt with my ministries of environment, which originally are not established for this purpose.
- Institutionalization thus stands as measure whether an issue is securitized.

# Institutionalization of security - 3

- Security is often used to silence the opposition, to exploit threats for justifying means employed.
- More security, is not better.
- Security should be seen as negative as it is failure to deal with issues under normal political rules.

# Security as subjective, intersubjective or constructive process

- Security can be approached objectively (real threat) or subjectively (perceived threat).
- Security is mainly subjective as it is determined by actors rather than by reality.
- Different states have different thresholds for defining a threat.
- Subjectivity is not enough; it becomes security when intersubjectively is recognized as such.

# Five sectors

- Military: interplay between defense capabilities and states' perceptions of each other.
- Political: stability of states, of government and of ideologies.
- Economic: access to resources and markets.
- Societal: sustainability of tradition, identity.
- Environmental: preservation of planet.



# How can security be achieved?

- Studying security should help achieve security.
- This is depended on how we think about security.
- What level of threat are actors willing to tolerate before taking action? Tolerance levels can vary.
- How security policies are formulated?

# Actors in achievement of security

- Who are agents of security? Individuals, states, non-state actors - humanitarian groups, private security, criminals.
- Some actors have capacity to provide security for others. E.g. US help for Kosovo.
- Sometimes individuals have ability to disseminate a persuasive message and help achieving security. E.g. Elderly statesmen or religious personalities.

# **THEORIES IN SECURITY STUDIES**

# Realist approach to security

- State privileged as object to security.
- Threats coming from military and economic competition.
- War cannot be abolished.
- States act in “self-help” forming alliances.
- Fear (deterrence) and prudence restrain the states (security dilemma).
- Violence is linked with political ends (national interests).

# Critical theories on security

- Critical School: holistic definition of security and moving beyond military definition.
- Welsh School: security as emancipation of individuals and groups from constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.
- Feminist: elimination of unjust (gender) social relations.

# Liberal approach to security

- Development of rules (UN Charter, Geneva Conventions) and institutions (UN, OSCE, ASEAN Regional Forum) to govern state behaviour and punish wrongdoers.
- “Disarmament” as a method of prevention of war rather than deterrence.
- Liberal norms (rejection of use of force) coexist with realist norms such as use of force when nation under threat.

# Liberal concepts of security

- Collective Security: threat to a nation considered as collective threat requiring collective action.
- Common Security: achieving security not against adversary, but together with him.
- Cooperative Security: arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.
- Human Security: safety from threats; referent object is shifted from state to individual; threats not only from military.

# Constructivist approach to security

- Ideas and norms as basis for security.
- States act within norms voluntarily or under pressure.
- Security Community: Community settling disputes through peaceful means (EU, ASEAN).



# Copenhagen School's definition

- “Widening” view on the meaning of security.
- Keeping agenda open to many different types of threats (military and nonmilitary).
- To count threats as “security” they have to meet criteria that distinguish them from normal run of politics.
- They have to be staged as threats to a referent object by securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures.

# Copenhagen School on security region

- Security concerns do not travel well over distances and threats are therefore most likely to occur in the region.
- Security of each actor in a region interacts with security of other actors.
- There is often intense security interdependence within a region, but not between regions.

# Readings for this lesson:

## Must readings:

- Williams, pages: 1-10.

## Optional:

- Buzan, pages: 21-45.

# **War**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
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# On War

- War caused huge amounts of suffering.
- But also prompted technological innovation.
- Acted as catalyst for social and political reforms.

# On War - 2

- End of Cold War reduced the threat of major war between great powers.
- But many parts of developing world suffer from wars.
- Wars declined in both their number and intensity recently.
- But huge sums of money are still spent on wars.

# Three philosophies of war

- Political,
- Eschatological, and
- Cataclysmic.

# Political philosophy

- Clausewitz's "On War" - The Philosopher of War; proponent of political philosophy of war; war as "act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will".
- War as rational, national and instrumental.
- Decision for waging war is made on basis of rational calculation taken by political authority in order to achieve some specified goal.



# Political philosophy - 2

- Political authority resides in states.
- War as legitimate instrument of states, but to be used only with clear purpose.
- In practice, victory in such wars went to those who were best in arts of attrition and maneuver.
- War as a game of strategy.

# Eschatological philosophy

- History will culminate in “final” war leading to grand design - divine, natural, or human.
- War as a mission.

# Eschatological philosophy - 2

Two variants: messianic and global.

- Messianic: “imposing a just peace on the world”; “eliminating war from future history”. E.g. Nazis.
- Global: establish world order in which wars will not occur. E.g. Communism defeating capitalism to establish peace in the world.

# Cataclysmic philosophy

- War as catastrophe to humanity; as epidemic.
- War as punishment from God or as product of anarchic international system.

# Cataclysmic philosophy - 2

Two variants: ethnocentric and global.

- Ethnocentric: war as not beneficial; all that can be done is to prevent the war.
- Global: war is cataclysm that affects humanity as a whole and not just this or that group of humans; no one will benefit from it.

# Earlier dominance of political philosophy

- From Napoleonic era until WWI, “political philosophy” dominated.
- However, developments in military technology rendered methods of attrition incredibly costly and the art of maneuver impossible.
- Result was that eschatological and cataclysmic philosophies gained prominence.

# Erosion of appeal of “political philosophy”

“Political philosophy”’s appeal eroded due to:

1. Concept of battlefield dissolved; battle grounds now are everywhere (urban areas, space).
2. Warring parties adopted eschatological philosophies in their respective rallying cries.
3. War involving nuclear weapons.
4. Targets are not easily identifiable.

# Is Clausewitz's thinking still relevant?

- “Clausewitzian” world is obsolete.
- Now is era of ethnic and religious wars.
- War not waged by armies but by groups.
- Their organizations are constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional.
- Motivated less by “professionalism” than by fanatical, ideological loyalties.



# Is Clausewitz's thinking still relevant?

## - 2

- Clausewitz's trinity (state, military, people) can not be dismissed as irrelevant.
- Clausewitz's trinity is useful to analyze actors' purpose, despite them not being states.
- Non-state actors also have relationship with people; there will be armed forces; there will be political direction.
- There is shift in emphasis from destruction to communication (interpretation matters).

# Defining war: cultural definition

- War has different meanings depending on culture.
- War as expression of culture and in some societies the culture itself.
- War as socially constructed category.

# Defining war: legal definition

- War as legal condition which permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force.
- Parties can be legally in a state of war without overt violence occurring between them. E.g. North and South Korea following ceasefire of 1953.

# Defining war: political definition

- Political: Defined by Clausewitz, war as type of political activity involving violence.
- Organized violence carried on by political units against each other.
- Violence is not war unless it is carried out in name of a political unit.
- Violence carried out in name of political unit is not war unless it is directed against another political unit.

# Trends in armed conflicts since 1945

Four main trends in armed conflicts since 1945:

1. From 1970s significant decline in interstate armed conflict; internal conflicts accounting for vast majority of organized violence (34 in 2002, 25 by 2005); of 118 armed conflicts occurring in 1989-2004, only 7 interstate wars.

# Trends in armed conflicts since 1945 - 2

2. Another trend: 52 state-based armed conflicts in 1991-1992, number of these dramatically declining by some 40% between 1992-2005.

Decline in armed conflicts due to following:

- End of colonialism and End of Cold War.
- UN preventive diplomacy, peacemaking.
- Increasing popularity of global norms that forbid use of military force.

# Trends in armed conflicts since 1945 - 3

3. Third trend: decline in battle-deaths. From per conflict and per year deaths of 38,000 in 1950 to 700 in 2005, 98% decrease.
4. Fourth trend: major wars becoming confined to small portion of the world. Until 1970s East and Southeast Asia suffered most, and later Middle East, Asia, Africa. From 1990s sub-Saharan Africa became most conflict-prone region. Between 1946 and 2005, Africa suffered 69 of the world's 187 armed conflicts.

# Definition of armed conflict

- Armed conflict as contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.



# Types of armed conflict

## I. State-based armed conflicts:

1. Interstate armed conflict: between states.
2. Intrastate armed conflict: between government and opposition groups.
  - 2a. civil wars: for control of existing government.
  - 2b. state-formation/secessionist conflicts: between government and territorial opposition group that is seeking to redraw borders of state.

# Types of armed conflict - 2

3. Internationalized intrastate armed conflict: between government and opposition groups but with additional intervention from other states.
  4. Extrastate armed conflict: between state and non-state group outside that state's territory.
- II. Non-state armed conflicts: violence occurs but where government is not one of parties.

# Scales of armed conflict

1. Minor armed conflicts: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during conflict.
2. Intermediate armed conflicts: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year.
3. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.

# Wars in Progress, 2017

- Wars (1000+ battle-related deaths in year): Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ukraine, South Sudan, Israel/Gaza, Somalia, Yemen.
- Serious armed conflicts (200-999 battle-deaths in year): India, Uganda, Libya, Sudan, Egypt.
- Other armed conflicts (fewer than 200 battle-deaths in year): Algeria, D.R. Congo, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey.

# Wars in Progress

- Syria: The world's bloodiest war by far.
- Iraq: ISIS; Sunni tribes who oppose Shi'ite government.
- Afghanistan: Government against Taliban.
- Pakistan: Government against Taliban.
- Nigeria: Government against Boko Haram; fighting spills over into Cameroon and Chad.
- Ukraine: Low-level fighting, ongoing in the east.
- South Sudan: Ethnic conflict.
- Israel/Gaza: Israel fighting with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
- Somalia: Government against al Shabab militants.
- Yemen: Sectarian fighting.

# Serious armed conflicts

- India: Maoist insurgencies; violence in Kashmir; interstate armed conflict with Pakistan.
- Uganda: Civil war.
- Libya: Between armed militias.
- Sudan: Darfur; conflicts near South Sudan.
- Egypt: Insurgency in Sinai.

# **“Civil War” - definition**

- Civil War used to describe revolution, peasant rebellion, ethnic conflict.
- Often used as a metaphor for extreme conflict and widespread brutality.
- Use of it as part of conflict, conferring or denying legitimacy to parties in the conflict.
- During the war, preferred by insurgents in search of legitimacy, denied by incumbents who label their opponents.

# “Civil War” – definition - 2

- Common definition: “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities”.
- Key intuition is violent physical division of the sovereign entity into rival armed camps; de facto territorial division.
- At the war’s start, rivals are subjects to a common sovereign or authority.



# Why “Civil War” is fought?

- For different reasons: differences of doctrine, of ascription (ethnicity, religion), power grabbing.
- Parties may be supported by external actors or relying on local resources, seeking to capture the state or to divide it.
- Civil wars occurs when there is effective breakdown of monopoly of violence; producing divided or dual sovereignty.

# Which wars are “civil wars”?

- Membership to sovereign entity by belligerents when the war begins is essential in civil wars.
- Civil war became dominant form of war in late Roman Empire and is constant since then.
- Revolutions, peasant, revolutionary and ethnic insurgencies, anticolonial uprisings, resistance wars against foreign occupiers are civil wars.
- Violent protests, riots, crime, and low-level banditry, all of which leave sovereignty intact, are excluded from category of civil wars.

# “Violence”

- At basic level, violence is deliberate infliction of harm on people.
- War “causes” violence.
- But, areas consumed by same conflict can exhibit variation in violence.
- Thus, there is distinction between “civil war” and “violence in civil war”.
- And distinction between “violence in peace” and “violence in war”.

# Analysis of “Violence”

- Scale of violence: mass killing; mass crimes; massacres.
- Mode and technique: riots, pogroms, reprisals.
- Motivations of perpetrators.
- Specific historical and social context of a particular instance.

# Aims of “Violence”

- Intimidation, demoralization, polarization, radicalization of the public, publicity, improvement of group morale, mobilization of forces and resources, elimination of opposing forces, sanction of cooperation with enemy, etc.
- Violence may also be used with no goal in mind (E.g. Looting).

# Motivations of “Violence”

- Individual and collective motivations of violence: anger, discord, envy, hatred, peer pressure, obedience, honor, rituals, collective imaginaries, greed, revenge, sadistic impulses.
- Individual motivations alone are not enough to result in large-scale violence without collective motivations. E.g. Nazi crimes.
- Violence is used for two aims: extermination or intimidation (instill fear, control a group).

# Types of “mass violence”

- State terror: purposive elimination of one group.
- Genocide: intentional group annihilation.
- Mass deportation.
- Civil war violence.
- Reciprocal extermination: neither actor is able to control the final outcome.

# Who fights? Who dies?

- Who fights: states, IOs, non-state actors (mercenaries, private companies, insurgents, paramilitaries, militias, self-defense forces, terrorists, suicide bombers, child soldiers).
- Who dies: Civilians account for greater proportion of killed in armed conflicts; 30-60% of deaths are civilians; 56% increase in massacres against civilians since 1989.



# Who else dies?

- Humanitarian aid workers: 1997-2005, number of humanitarian workers killed each year increased from 39 to 61.
- Indirect deaths (children, elderly, women): biggest single category of war deaths: dying from war-exacerbated disease, malnutrition.

# Is the nature of war changing?

## Idea of “Total War”

- “Total War” idea revolved around notions of escalation and participation.
- Fear of escalation: concern that once starts, war becomes difficult to control; wars likely to increase in scale and intensity.
- Participation: growing involvement of citizens in war.
- But, wars are always less than total.

# Is the nature of war changing?

## Idea of “Total War” - 2

- Limits are imposed on use of weapons on wars.
- Warring parties do not commit entirety of their resources to wars.
- It has been exceptional to have a total war. E.g. Vietnam.

# Growing 'totality' of wars between 1861-1945

- Technological advances leading to destruction.
- Governments became able to mobilize resources.
- Expanding scope of war aims; goals of territorial gains or economic advantage, replaced by aim to achieve outright victory.
- War became global.
- Blurred distinction between civilian and military spheres.

# **‘New Wars’ debate**

- Emergence of “new wars” since 1945.
- Blurred distinctions between war, organized crime, and large-scale violations of human rights.
- New wars as distinct in terms of their goals, methods, finance.
- New wars leading to erosion of state’s monopoly of legitimate organized violence.

# **‘New Wars’ debate - 2**

- New Wars are difficult to bring to end.
- They are intrastate rather than interstate wars.
- They take place in context of state failure and social transformation.
- Ethnic and religious differences are more important than political ideology.
- Civilian casualties and forced displacement are increasing.

# Criticism of “new wars” thesis

- Trends identified in “new wars” thesis are not ‘new’.
- Globalization is not recent phenomenon; it is much older process; war has been globalizing force as it has interconnected people.

# Contemporary Western way of war

- Changing patterns of how Western states prefer to use military force.
- No wars between Western states, but West willing and able to fight wars.
- War becoming similar to spectator sports.



# Contemporary Western way of war - 2

- Has US-led 'global War on Terror' replaced the Cold War as a global conflict into which local conflicts are increasingly connected?
- Western wars as wars of choice to help achieve liberal policy objectives rather than survival.

# Spectator-sport wars

Several key characteristics:

- Localization of conflicts and desire to fight away from home.
- ‘Enemy’ the leadership of target state rather than the whole of enemy state’s society.
- Desire to minimize collateral damage.
- Force protection - minimize risks to Western forces (to avoid ‘body bag’ syndrome).
- Importance of airpower.

# **EXERCISE: CONSIDERING CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IS WWII POSSIBLE?**

# Is a new, inter-state world war possible?

- Interstate war is unusual in present day.
- State-assisted nonstate groups often fight governments.
- Earlier, there were inter-state wars (Iran-Iraq, Eritrea-Ethiopia).
- WWI, WWII were catastrophic proof of instability of international system that allowed for frequent interstate conflicts and that considered war as legitimate option.

# Is a new, inter-state world war possible? - 2

- Since WWII, systems are built to prevent states from going to war with one another.
- Interstate war as recurring characteristic of global politics and it could make a comeback.
- There have been earlier periods in which people believed that nations would no longer go to war.
- From 1815 to 1871 there was no interstate war, then came WWI.

# Is a new, inter-state world war possible? - 3

- There has never been a century that has not had systemic war (Seven Years War, Napoleonic Wars, WWI, WWII).
- Do you believe that 21<sup>st</sup> century will be only century that doesn't have one?
- International system have inherent fatal weaknesses.

# Is a new, inter-state world war possible? - 4

- Current international system also contains seeds of its own destruction.
- Current world order still allows for crises that the system itself is incapable of solving.
- Decline of certain global powers can establish a crisis.

# Origins of WWII?

## System level causes:

- Structural changes: rise of new powers; loss of flexibility in alliances; balance of power becoming again bipolar; failure of UN security system; undeterred Russia, Iran.
- Process changes: rise of nationalism; loss of alliance solidarity; aggressive buildup in military; growing authoritarianism.



# Origins of WWII? - 2

## State level causes, domestic politics:

- Economic crisis.
- US' growing isolationism.
- Russia pushing to seek hegemony outside.

# Origins of WWII? - 3

## Individual level causes:

- Low quality of leaders.
- ...

# Is WWIII inevitable?

- Three types of causes in terms of proximity of time to possible start of WWIII: deep causes, intermediate causes, precipitating causes.
- Deep causes: changes in international system and changes in domestic systems.
- Intermediate causes: Russian policy, weak leadership, economic crisis.
- Precipitating cause: downing of Russian plane by Turkey?; Russia's hacking of US systems.

# Lessons learned from WWII

- First: rise to power of nationalistic and undemocratic regimes.
- Second: democracies would be under threat if economies performed badly.
- Third: Neglecting to confront expansionist powers.

# Readings for this lesson:

## Must readings:

- Williams, pages: 151-169.

## Optional:

- Kalyvas, pages: 16-31.
- Film: Na Wewe.

# **Ethnic conflict**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
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# Introduction

- Ethnic identities exists throughout history.
- Conflicts arise when different groups mix.
- Not all ethnic situations are prone to conflicts.
- When issue is dominance of one group over another, ethnic clashes do sometimes occur.
- Ethnic conflicts often are of critical importance.

# Ethnic conflicts in 20<sup>th</sup> century

- Ethnic wars became more important than ever before.
- Ethnic conflicts were more common than international wars in 20<sup>th</sup> century.
- In 1990s, about half of wars were ethnic conflicts.
- Ethnic conflict one of major sources of insecurity in the world.



# Ethnic conflicts in 20<sup>th</sup> century - 2

- From 10 bloodiest civil wars of 20<sup>th</sup> century, half were ethnic conflicts (Sudan-South Sudan, 1983-2005; Bangladesh-Pakistan, 1971; Rwanda, 1994; Bosnia, 1992-1995).
- Each became a major international issue.
- Even ethnic riots can be deadly.

# What are ethnic groups?

- Groups involved are primarily ascriptive, i.e. membership in groups assigned at birth.
- Members of ethnic groups do not convert; conversion is not always accepted.
- Identities of ethnic groups are ‘sticky’, hard to change.

# What are ethnic groups? - 2

- A group is ethnic group if members share: common name, believed common descent, elements of shared culture (language, religion), common historical memory, attachment to particular territory.
- One view is that many ethnic identities are historical.

# What are ethnic groups? - 3

- Most people have multiple identities or overlapping identities.
- Identities sometimes change, new ones emerge, old ones disappear. E.g. 'Yugoslav' identity.
- Second group of scholars argue that ethnic identity is not 'primordial', but 'instrumental'.

# What are ethnic groups? - 4

- From 'instrumental' perspective, people follow 'ethnic' leaders when it is in their interests to do so; leaders try to establish ethnic solidarity when it works for them.
- Ethnic conflict can be blamed on leaders who mislead their followers in pursuit of their own power.

# What are ethnic groups? - 5

- Third view: ethnic identities are 'socially constructed'.
- They are not 'natural'.
- There are 'invented traditions'; histories are simply made up to establish new identities.

# What are ethnic groups? - 6

- ‘Accepted’ history of group and criteria for distinguishing who is a member is established.
- Heroes and enemies identified.
- Symbols of group’s identity glorified.
- Mythologies ‘mythicise’ real history.  
E.g. 1389 Battle of Kosovo for Serbs.

# Overview of ethnic groups – ‘minorities at risk’

- Ethnic groups are everywhere.
- Most countries in the world are ethnically diverse.
- Minorities at risk - socially disadvantaged: total of 275 ethnic or communal groups in 116 countries (more than a billion people, or about 17.4% of world's population).



# Overview of ethnic groups – ‘minorities at risk’ - 2

- Of 50 biggest countries, only four – Poland, Tanzania, Nepal and North Korea – do not have at least one ‘minority at risk’.
- Some of these groups are small, in mostly homogeneous countries.
- Some of groups are very large and important.

# What is ethnic conflict?

- There is no agreement on what counts as ethnic conflict.
- How about 'religious', 'communal' or 'sectarian', 'racial' conflicts?
- One view is that ethnic conflict is based on 'ancient hatreds' that are impossible to eradicate and nearly impossible to manage.

# What is ethnic conflict? - 2

- How to tell whether a particular conflict is an ethnic conflict?
- A conflict is ethnic only if the sides involved are distinguished primarily on the basis of ethnicity.
- Existence of minority groups should not lead to conflicts.

# Overview of ethnic conflicts

- In 1995, most of 'minorities at risk' (58%) were politically inactive or mobilized only for politics.
- Another 15% were engaged in rioting.
- Still, ethnic conflicts were present: 49 (18%) of 'minorities at risk' were engaged in 'small-scale rebellion' in 1995, and another 22 (8%) were fighting 'large-scale rebellion'.

# Overview of ethnic conflicts - 2

- Number of ethnic conflicts increased after WWII until 1990s, but then it started to drop.
- In 2003, only 11 wars were ethnic conflicts: Taliban in Afghanistan, Karen in Burma, Hutu–Tutsi in Burundi, Kashmir in India, Palestine against Israel, southern Philippines, Chechnya, Tamil in Sri Lanka, Sudan, Kurdish in Turkey.

# Why ethnic conflicts happen?

Ethnic conflicts involve regional minority who want to:

- Separate and form their own state.
- Form autonomous region.
- Seek further rights.
- To take over government of whole country.

# Why ethnic conflicts happen? - 2

- Goals are often unclear, as rebels may disagree with each other.
- Only rarely are these conflicts 'religious' in sense of one group trying to impose its religion on another - even when the groups in conflict differ in religion.

# Ancient hatreds or fear?

- Are ethnic conflicts caused directly by intergroup differences, or ancient hatreds?
- Were ethnic passions frozen during Cold War and released afterwards?
- A view is that none of above.
- Reason is sought in the “fears of future”, where future is interpreted via “past”.
- Fear emerges when states fail (state weakness) to provide future to ethnic groups.



# Sources of ethnic conflicts

Three approaches to explanations of ethnic wars: instrumentalist approaches, social mobilization and social psychology.

- Instrumentalist approach: conditions that establish opportunity for rebels to act: weak governments, large populations, inaccessible terrain, extremist leaders seeking to grab or hold on to power, extremist media.

# Sources of ethnic conflicts - 2

- Last two factors work together; extremist leaders provide heroes for extremist media to promote, while media validates extremist leaders' claims.
- Social mobilization approach: leadership roles and ways ethnic groups mobilize.
- People use social organizations and networks that already exist.

# Sources of ethnic conflicts - 3

- Successful mobilization efforts find 'brokers'/'ethnic activists' who can link different groups together to make them cooperate in a single movement.
- Social Psychological approach: Barriers of language or religion within ethnic group separate them from members of other groups.

# Sources of ethnic conflicts - 4

- A group is defined by stories it tells about the group's history and identity.
- When a group's myth points to the other group as an enemy, its members will be predisposed to be hostile to the other group.
- Politicians will then be able to appeal to past hostility to rise people's emotions.
- Then group becomes convinced that they will be wiped out in case they do not resort to violence justified as 'self-defense'.

# Sources of ethnic conflicts related to fear of ethnic groups

- Resource competition. E.g. jobs.
- State as object of struggle as it sets the terms of competition.
- State loosing its neutrality.
- Feeling that welfare can be improved only at the expense of others.

# Ethnic conflicts arising as a result of strategic dilemmas

- Information failures: incentives to misrepresent information.
- Problems of credible commitment: lack of confidence to each other, fear of future exploitation, uncertainty of intentions of the other, loss of checks and balances among ethnic groups, changes in ethnic balance of power.
- Security dilemma: feeling of insecurity.

# Are ethnic conflicts economic?

- A view is that ethnic conflicts are economic.
- Some argue that causality between ethnic diversity and civil war is weak, and that main causes of wars are poverty.
- However, while economic issues are present, in conflicts they are expressed ethnically.
- In some cases, it is not the poor but the rich one that rebel (Croats, Slovenes).

# Riots as source of ethnic conflicts

- Riots typically begin suddenly, after a minor incident; once they begin they mushroom in size, causing widespread violence.
- Although riots involve little or no planning, they entail careful selection of victims.
- No discrimination between ages and sexes: children, women and men of all ages may be targeted for torture and murder.



# Factors that lead to deadly ethnic riots

- Ongoing hostile relationship between groups.
- Authoritative social support: rioters need to be assured by community leaders that killing members of other group is justified.
- Riots usually become large only if police are sympathetic, or at least do not make determined efforts to stop the killing.

# Factors that lead to deadly ethnic riots - 2

- Psychology: Stimulus, some event, threat that provokes fear or hatred. E.g. news (true or not) of violent attack against one of 'us'.
- Political change, even potential one, might provoke conflict.
- Social organization: there are riot-prone cities, where there are 'institutionalized riot systems'.

# **Case study: 2001 Ethic conflict in Macedonia. How it started?**

- MK, escaped the wars of 1990s.
- But was unable to meet the grievances of its minorities.
- Albanians, forming largest minority of country, demanded a greater role in the country's politics and public administration.

# **Case study: 2001 Ethic conflict in Macedonia. How it started? - 2**

- Conflict started in February 2001 when security forces, mainly composed by ethnic Macedonians, clashed with the armed Albanian National Liberation Army.
- The conflict caused deaths of around 150 people and destruction of infrastructure in conflict zones.

# **Case study: 2001 Ethic conflict in Macedonia. How it started? - 3**

- State weakness.
- Loss of neutrality of state.
- Resource competition.
- State as object of struggle as it sets the terms of competition.
- Feeling that welfare can be improved only at the expense of others.
- Fear of future, but affected by the past.

# International security dimensions of ethnic conflicts

Ethnic conflicts often have important international consequences.

- Diaspora: Diasporas playing important role in ethnic conflicts.
- Refugees: Ethnic civil wars produce particularly large numbers of refugees because of fear of genocide, ethnic cleansing.

# International security dimensions of ethnic conflicts - 2

- Refugees then in turn become source of insecurity. E.g. refugees might turn their refugee camps into bases from which to attack their former homeland.
- Diplomacy: ethnic civil wars often become major issue for international diplomacy; sometimes effective, sometimes unsuccessful diplomacy.

# International security dimensions of ethnic conflicts - 3

- Peacekeeping: when diplomacy is not enough, peacekeepers are sent to manage ethnic violence.
- Foreign intervention/aid: ethnic conflicts often lead to external intervention: provide weapons, training, humanitarian interventions.



# International security dimensions of ethnic conflicts - 4

- External aid is often ethnically motivated, with countries backing the side more closely related to them. E.g. Russian support to Serbs, German support to Croats, Muslims support to Bosniacs.
- Sometimes these interventions are purely opportunistic rather than ethnically based.
- Ethnic civil wars may also turn into international wars.

# Resolution of ethnic civil wars

- First view: To arrange a compromise settlement. E.g. power-sharing in central government, regional autonomy.
- Second view: Ethnic wars end when one side is repressed militarily or is granted its own separate state or autonomy.
- Third view: Ethnic wars end when one side wins: usually the government, but occasionally rebel ethnic group.

# How ethnic conflicts end?

- Peace in ethnic conflicts result from: military victory, partition, foreign intervention, compromise, exhaustion or stalemate.
- Of 27 ethnic civil wars resolved between 1944 and 1994 found that 16 of the cases, or 59%, ended either in a military victory or in a partition that stemmed from a military victory. E.g. Nigeria in Biafra in 1960s.

# Foreign aid and partition as source for resolving ethnic conflicts

- In other cases rebels attracted enough foreign aid to win: in 1971, India went to war against Pakistan to help Bengalis establish separate state (an example of partition); and in 1994, Rwandan Tutsi rebels backed by Uganda defeated the genocidal Hutu leadership of Rwanda.
- In Bosnia, result was partition: each group received its own autonomous area.

# Compromise as source for resolving ethnic conflicts

- Some ethnic conflicts are settled in a compromise deal; but some of these deals collapse later. E.g. Sudan's first civil war was settled in 1972 that gave autonomy to southerners, but that deal collapsed into renewed fighting in 1983; Peace agreements in Lebanon of 1958 and 1976, collapsed later.
- Oslo accords of 1993, collapsed into renewed fighting in 2000 between Israeli–Palestinians.

# **Stalemate and power sharing as source for resolving ethnic conflicts**

- Exhaustion or stalemate as a source for peace: E.g. Bosnian war ended in a stalemate; each side succeeded in gaining control of share of territory.
- Power-sharing: Few conflicts ended through power-sharing deal. E.g. South Africa, 1994; N. Ireland, 1998.

# Foreign intervention for resolving ethnic conflicts

External intervention can have three forms:

- Non-coercive intervention: carrots and sticks.
- Coercive intervention: military interventions.
- Third-party mediation: 14 out of 57 civil wars ending with mediation between 1945-1993.

# Major trust building mechanisms

- Demonstrations of respect: take anxieties, grievances and resentments into account.
- Power sharing: build representative government.
- Elections: ensure fair elections.
- Regional autonomy and federalism: to avoid fear of majority domination.



# Overcome fear as source for resolving ethnic conflicts

- Ethnic conflicts cannot be entirely resolved via confidence building measures.
- Ending ethnic wars requires reassurance to ethnic groups for their physical and cultural security.
- Establish reliable safety nets.
- Protect ethnic groups from dilemmas.

# Case study: How Macedonia's ethnic conflict ended? Ohrid Agreement



# Case study: How Macedonia's ethnic conflict ended?

- Stalemate, mediation, compromise, power sharing, autonomy, non-territorial solutions.
- Peace agreement (Ohrid Framework Agreement) included: more powers to municipalities, increased representation of minority representatives in state administration, education, use of minority languages, protection of the minorities from being overruled by the majorities, special provisions for expressing of minority identity.

# How to resolve ongoing ethnic conflicts?

- Ongoing ethnic conflicts remain extremely difficult to settle.
- Many of those that have been settled are at risk of recurring.
- International involvement not always helpful.
- What is likely resolution of Syrian conflict?

# Readings for this lesson:

## Must readings:

- Williams, pages: 200-215.

## Optional:

- Lake, pages: 41-75.

# **State Failure**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
Epoka University**

# Introduction

- Among greatest threats to security is “state failure” or “failed state”.
- What is “Failed State”:  
disintegrated state; situation where responsibilities of sovereign government no longer function.

# Characteristics of Failed State

1. Loss of control of territory / loss of monopoly on legitimate use of force.
2. Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions.
3. Inability to provide public services.
4. Inability to interact with other states.



# Theorizing state failure

- Literature focuses on reasons for emergence of state failure around the world.
- Ethnicity, Resource wealth, poverty, recession, democratization.

# Sources of state failure

- State weakness.
- Little control over much of territory.
- States with no-go areas.
- Existence of non-state armed actors.
- Wars, Conflicts.
- No public services provided.
- Widespread corruption and criminality.
- Sharp economic decline.

# Sources of state failure - 2

- Anarchy.
- Ethnic divisions exploited.
- Inability of state to prevent insurgencies.
- Weakness of state leading to opportunities for neighbors to engage.

Note: Failed states are not taken out of the international system.

# When a state fails?

- A state should maintain monopoly on legitimate use of force; if not, a state becomes failed state.
- The state is rendered ineffective.
- It is not able to enforce its laws uniformly.
- There is "implosion of the state", where state transforms "into an instrument of predation".

# Gaps that a failed state is not able to provide

- Capacity: when state institutions lack ability to deliver basic services.
- Security: when state is unable to provide security under threat of armed groups.
- Legitimacy: when significant portion of society reject the rules regulating distribution of wealth.

# Pathway to State Failure

A state is failed if it lost:

- Effectiveness: capability to carry out state functions.
- Legitimacy: support of important groups of population.

A state that retains one of two aspects isn't failed, however it is in great danger of failing soon.

# Other possible pathways to state failure

1. Escalation ethnic conflicts: Bosnia.
2. State predation: Montenegro.
3. Regional or guerrilla rebellion: Kosovo.
4. Democratic collapse leading to civil war or coup d'état: Kenya.
5. Succession crisis in authoritarian states: African states; Indonesia; Soviet Union.

# Failed state and criminality

- Failed states serve as sanctuaries for criminals.
- Failed states experience and produce more criminality.
- Failed states are unable or unwilling to cooperate in the arrest or prosecution of criminals.



# Criticisms of the Failed State concept

- It is arbitrary and sensationalist.
- It has no coherent definition.
- It only serves goals of states to militarily intervene in other states.
- States have traditionally faced some armed resistance.
- Selective branding of the states as failed.  
E.g. Pakistan vs. Sri Lanka.

# Criticisms of the Failed State concept - 2

- Wide range of divergent states are categorized as failed states.
- It can conceal specific weaknesses identified within individual states and result in one size fits all approach. Other categories suggested: 'Collapsed state', 'Weak state', 'War-torn state', 'Authoritarian state'.

# Criticisms of the Failed State concept -

## 3

- Challenges to the state can be very different depending on the type of armed conflict; whether it encompasses the country as a whole, or is specifically focused around one regional area.
- Concept criticized for reflecting a Western bias of what constitutes a successful state.

# Criticisms of the Failed State concept - 4

- Term limited in its approach; it does not take into account different types of states that have developed.
- Statehood based on territorially sovereign and central government has failed.
- No to rigid borders which have contributed to conflict and instability.
- Certain "failed states" might be better off under a decentralized government.

# Measurement of state failure:

## Quantitative methods

- Quantitative measurement means establishment of indexes and rankings.
- “Fragile States Index” (formerly “Failed States Index”) by Fund for Peace.
- “States of Fragility” by OECD.
- “Index of State Weakness” of Brookings.
- Other indexes: “Freedom House Index”, “Human Development Index”, “World Bank Governance Indicators”.

# Fragile States Index

- Fragile States Index categorizes states in different categories: Very high alert (South Sudan), high alert, alert, high warning, warning, low warning (Macedonia, Albania), less stable (Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Romania, Greece), stable, more stable, sustainable, very sustainable (Finland).

# Fragile States Index - 2

- There are three groupings of indicators:

Social Indicators: Demographic Pressures, Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons, Group Grievance, Human Flight and Brain Drain.

Economic Indicators: Uneven Economic Development, Poverty and Economic Decline.

Political and Military Indicators: State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights/Rule of Law, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, External Intervention.

# States of Fragility, OECD

Five indicators used:

- Violence,
- Access to justice,
- Accountable and inclusive institutions,
- Economic inclusion and stability, and
- Capacities to prevent and adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters.



# Measurement of state failure:

## Qualitative methods

- It embraces theoretical frameworks.
- It applies stage models to allow a categorisation of states.
- Four statehood types based on existence of monopoly of use of force: (1) consolidated and consolidating states, (2) weak states, (3) failing, (4) collapsed/failed states.

# **HOW ALBANIA FAILED IN 1997?**

# 1997 Albania

- In 1997 law and order collapsed in Albania.
- 1997 was second collapse of the state in less than a decade (consider 1990).
- 1997 hit hard the country leading to anarchy and political/economic collapse.
- Government was toppled; 2,000 people were killed; large scale of confiscation of state assets.

# What happened in 1997?

- Started in Jan 1997, with anti-government protests for collapse of pyramid schemes.
- Arms depots were looted; most of weaponry still unaccounted for.
- Riots causing human and material costs.
- Armed battles in several towns.
- Prisons opened releasing criminals.

# What happened in 1997? - 2

- Government declared state of emergency and imposed a curfew; censorship imposed outlawing foreign radio and television news programs.
- Revival of blood feud or revenge killing.
- Thousands fled or attempted to flee on boats to Italy.
- Emergence of armed National Salvation Committees.

# What happened in 1997? - 3

- Large share of population's savings lost.
- Significant parts of territory remained controlled by irregular, armed bands.
- Economy shrank.
- National reconciliation government (March).
- Number of personalities fled.
- President resigned.
- Elections (June).

# Sources of 1997

- Catalyst of collapse were pyramid schemes. What were pyramid schemes?
- Other reasons: little control over much of territory; no-go areas; existence of non-state armed actors; widespread criminality; sharp economic decline.
- Real reasons of 1997 collapse can be sought in other areas: weak state, political polarization.

# **Applying theoretical framework to 1997 Albania**

- Limited applicability of following variables: Ethnicity, Natural resources.
- More applicability of following variables: Poverty, Democratization.



# What were features that made Albania a failed state case?

- Albania lost monopoly on legitimate use of force.
- State became ineffective.
- It was not able to enforce its laws uniformly.
- There was "implosion of the state".

# Failed cities

- While state may function in general, subnational units, may collapse in terms of infrastructure, economy.
- Certain cities may also fall outside state control, becoming a de facto ungoverned part of the state.
- Some area become no-go areas.

# The case of Lazarat, 2014

- No go area.
- Police operation, June 2014.
- Suspected cannabis growers opened fire.
- Police destroyed cannabis plants.
- Many of the growers fled, but police could not enter the entire village.

# **CONCEPTS RELATED TO PREVENTION OF STATE FAILURE**

# **“Responsible Sovereignty”**

- Need to establish states capable of governing effectively within their own borders.
- Irresponsible sovereigns and failing states threaten well-being of their own populations and security of world’s most powerful countries.
- There is no alternative to responsible sovereigns; no regional much less global authority structure can replace the state.

# **“Responsible Sovereignty” - 2**

- Effective sovereign states as necessary condition for peace and prosperity.
- States to be able to regulate activities and provide public services within their own borders.
- Controlling violence within states.
- Concluding mutually beneficial agreements among states.

# “Responsible Sovereignty” - 3

- Principal security threat of past - war among the major powers - is gone.
- Poorly governed and weak states now present the greatest threat.
- Failing states with many alienated young men.
- Nuclear weapons are not beyond the reach.
- Attacks can lead to changes in social behavior, political sentiments.

# **“Responsibility to Protect”**

- Responsibility shared by state and International Community.
- Primary R2P resides with state whose people are affected by conflict.
- If the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, than it becomes responsibility of IC to act in its place.



# **“Responsibility to Protect” - 2**

- Distinction between a state's internal and external responsibility.
- States' authorities are responsible for safety of their citizens internally.
- At same time states have external responsibility towards IC through UN.

# **“Responsibility to Protect” - 3**

- when a state is clearly unwilling or unable to fulfill its R2P,
- when a state is itself perpetrator of crimes,
- where people living outside a state are threatened by actions taking place there.

# Readings for this lesson:

## Must readings:

- Bates, pages: 6-12; 15-29.

## Optional:

Bates, pages: 97-139.

Atzili, pages: 139-154.

# **Armed Groups**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
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# **ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS**

# Introduction

- Weak, failing or failed states are unable to provide basic security to people.
- These situations lead to emergence of non-state armed groups.
- They undermine state's monopoly of use of force.

# What are Armed Non-State Groups?

- 1) Willing and able to use violence for pursuing their objectives; and
  - 2) Not integrated into formalized state institutions such as armed or police forces.
- They may be supported by state actors whether officially or informally.

# Types:

**Rebels, guerrilla fighters, partisans**

- Fight for overthrow of government, for secession, for end of occupation, or colonialism.
- Pursue a political agenda.
- View themselves as 'future armies' of a liberated population.



# Rebels, Guerrilla fighters, Partisans - 2

- Often wear uniforms in order to benefit from protection of international law.
- Resort to guerrilla warfare.
- Support to them comes from foreign governments or diaspora or other non-state actors that provide resources.
- E.g. PLO, UCK.

# Militias or Paramilitaries

- Irregular combat units that usually act on behalf of, or are tolerated by, a regime.
- Their task is to fight rebels, to threaten specific groups or to kill opposition leaders.
- Often established and funded for counter-insurgency by state authorities.

# Militias or Paramilitaries - 2

- Resort to targeted kidnappings, killings, massacres or ethnic cleansing.
- Often evade government control and develop their own agenda.
- “United Armed Forces of Novorossiya”, Ukraine - umbrella organization of Donbass People's Militia, Luhansk People's Militia and other autonomous armed groups in Eastern Ukraine.

# Militias or Paramilitaries - 3

Others:

- Gladio;
- Zemun Clan;
- protestant Ulster Defence Association in Northern Ireland;
- pro-Serbian Arkan Tigers in Bosnia and Kosovo;
- Hezbollah (Lebanon);
- Janjaweed militia in Darfur, Sudan.

# Clan chiefs or Big men

- Traditional, local authorities who head a particular tribe, clan, ethnic community.
- Attained their positions according to traditional rules.
- Control a certain territory and command armed force.
- E.g. clan families in Somalia; Tuaregs in Mali, Zulu in South Africa.

# Warlords

- Control a territory during or after end of war.
- Secure their power through private armies and benefit from exploiting resources and population (levying 'taxes').
- Some manage to perpetuate their rule even after end of war.
- E.g. Charles Taylor (Liberia), Kabila (Zaire/DR Congo) or Abdul Rashid Dostum (Afghanistan).

# Terrorists

- Aim to spread fear in societies in order to achieve political goals.
- Based on revolutionary, nationalistic or religious ideologies.
- Organized in clandestine way, in small groups, or in larger transnational networks.
- Weak actors who use terrorist attacks primarily as a mean to communicate their grievances and ideology.

# Terrorists - 2

- Means: hostage-taking, murder, suicide attacks, vehicle bombs, explosive devices.
- Targets: government buildings, companies, airports, restaurants, shopping malls, concert halls, means of public transport.
- Have a hierarchical structure.
- E.g. ETA (Spain), IRA (UK), PKK (Turkey), al-Qaeda, ISIS, Asala, Red Brigades (Italy), 17 November (Greece); LRA (Uganda).



# Criminals

- Members of Mafia-type structures, syndicates or gangs, as well as counterfeiters, smugglers or pirates.
- Means: robbery, fraud, blackmail, contract killing or illegal trade (e.g. weapons, drugs, people).
- They may also seek political influence in order to secure profit interests (Organized crime).

# **Mercenaries and Private security companies**

- Volunteers recruited from third states for fighting.
- They serve armies, warlords.
- They includes 'bounty hunters' who hunt down wanted criminals or terrorists.
- Private security or military companies have professionalized business in providing combatants, trainers, advisers.

# Marauders

- Demobilized former combatants who engage in terrorizing civilians.
- Beneficiaries of a chaotic situation.
- May be deployed by regular armed forces to handle dirty business of massacres or persecution of political opponents.

# Common features of armed groups

- No importance given to distinction made by international law between combatants and non-combatants (including civilians).
- Transnationalization of these groups.

# Differences between these armed groups: Change versus status quo orientation

- Some groups seek a radical change of status quo (terrorists, rebels, guerrilla fighters)
- Others not (warlords, criminals, clan chiefs and big men, militias or paramilitary organizations).
- Mercenaries or marauders behave opportunistically.

# Territorial versus non-territorial aspirations

- Guerrilla, Clan chiefs, Warlords, Mercenaries aim at conquest.
- Terrorists, Criminals, Marauders do not have territorial ambitions.
- Militias include both variants.

# Physical vs. Psychological violence

- Rebels, Guerrilla, Terrorists pursue goals by using physical violence.
- Terrorists also employ psychological techniques.
- Clan chiefs, Mercenaries use physical violence in order to defeat opponents.
- Marauders, Criminals use violence as a means of intimidation.
- Militias, Warlords use both forms of violence.

# Greed vs. Grievance

- Guerrilla, Militias, Clan chiefs, Big men, Terrorists pursue socio-political agenda.
- Warlords, Criminals are interested in securing economic privileges.
- Warlords, Criminals are not 'apolitical' actors; but their motivation is different.
- Mercenaries, Marauders pursue economic gains.



# Armed groups in Weak States

- In Weak States, armed groups are not able to control a particular territory, or at least not for long periods.
- Weak States are not primarily threatened by Clan Chiefs, Rebels, Warlords, but by Criminals, Terrorists.
- Security governance is dominated by state institutions, but conducted in ineffective way.

# Armed Groups in Failing States

- Failing States do not completely control their territory, and armed groups control a territory.
- Failing states still deliver public services to majority of population. E.g. Sri Lanka.
- Security governance is dominated by state institutions and armed groups.

# Armed Groups in Failed States

- Failed States are dominated by armed actors who rule not only regions, but may also control access to resources, trade, businesses, foreign aid.
- They act as 'security providers'.
- Security governance is shared by number of different non-state actors.

# **STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH ARMED NON-STATE GROUPS**

# Negotiating a political settlement

- Mediators aim at persuading armed actor to refrain from use of force and to abandon maximalist positions.
- Compromise is sought to be found.
- This scenario applies to groups with clear political agenda and which are tied to constituency (e.g. tribe, clan, ethnic group, political party).

# Socialization

- Institutional arrangements.  
E.g. electoral system, modes of power-sharing.
- This works for those armed actors with political ambitions.

# Bribery

- Groups are induced to cooperate or silenced through offer of material incentives. E.g. resources or posts.
- This strategy is normatively questionable; but often used. E.g. Afghanistan.
- Profit-driven actors - Warlords, Criminals, Mercenaries, Marauders are receptive to such a strategy.

# Amnesty

- Granting amnesty for crimes committed by armed groups.
- This works as incentive to end violence.
- Amnesty would be part of a larger political package and may not be applied to every crime or every group member.



# Containment and marginalization

- This strategy aims at containing political and ideological influence of armed actors.
- The idea is to isolate and marginalize them.
- For that, a consensus is needed among elites not to deal with these actors and not to react to their violent provocations.
- This approach is option in case of Rebel groups, Terrorists or Marauders.

# Enforcing splits and internal rivalry

- Fragmenting and splitting groups between moderate forces and hardliners.
- Offering secret deals to some figures to encourage them to leave their group or to transform into political movement.
- But this strategy can result in establishment of radical splinter groups.
- Often tried with Rebels or Terrorists.

# Coercion

- Coercive measures can also be used.
- Military or police operations aimed at fighting or arresting members of groups, deployment of intl troops in order to stabilize situation.
- Implementation of sanctions (e.g. embargoes, no-fly zones, freezing of foreign assets, travel sanctions, war criminal tribunals).
- Often applied to Para-militaries, Rebels, Warlords, Clan Chiefs.

# **WARLORDISM**

# Introduction to Warlordism

- Warlordism plagues many weak states.
- Warlordism occurred in different times in different places.
- Some have been able to eradicate warlordism; some not.
- Warlords maintain their authority only by preventing the emergence of a functioning state.

# Two sources of ending Warlordism

- (1) Emergence of strong economic interest groups that lead the charge against existing system; and
- (2) Appearance of transformative ideas from outside that support those groups' aims and convince increasingly literate population of desirability of change.

# Warlordism and Security

- Warlords are more powerful and authoritative than failed states' leaders.
- In Afghanistan, Somalia, government institutions failed to displace warlords.
- Instead, they continued their control over small pieces of territory.

# Why state like structures matter?

- Absence of functioning states is not problematic for states (Somalia, Afghanistan), where nation-state is artificial construct.
- Borders were imposed by colonial rule.
- Local tribes traditionally have been important decision-makers.
- State authorities (Somalia, Afghanistan) were often brutal toward their own citizens.



# Why state like structures matter? - 2

- According to this argument, focusing on state breakdown is a mistake, because societies and economies can function in absence of states.
- But, absence of laws, has exacted terrible costs on these societies.
- Thus, some form of stable governance system to provide security is necessary for minimum level of social well-being.

# Warlords and international security

- Absence of proper states in Somalia, AFG made rest of world insecure.
- Their international borders are poorly controlled and remain porous.
- AFG primary source for heroin sold in Europe, with links to Warlords, who profit from this drug trade.

# **International security is threatened by Warlordism**

- Warlord brutality enhances attractiveness of radical alternatives.
- Often radical elements receive support of population, who are willing to hide and feed fighters because they lack faith in warlord-dominated government.
- Warlords' actions may lead to inter-state armed conflicts.

# International support to warlords

- Warlords may be funded by other states (Ethiopia in Somalia, and Pakistan and Iran in Afghanistan) or by US, UN.
- US supported Afghan warlords during AFG's civil war against Soviets in 1980s.
- Warlords were part of US-led 2001–02 war against Taliban and al-Qaeda.

# Definition of warlordism

- Self-interested actors who seek wealth and power, who avoid acquiring fixed assets that they have to guard, and who fail to provide any public good.
- Warlords are interested only in providing private goods and services to recipients who have been carefully chosen.

# Definition of warlordism - 2

- Warlords engage in indiscriminate violence against the population.
- Warlords are likely to provide at least the limited public good of security.
- There is also a role of loyalty and reciprocity in sustaining the power of warlords.
- Warlords need militias to support them.

# Definition of warlordism - 3

- Legitimacy of warlords stems from their personal charisma and devotion of followers.
- This devotion in turn depends on the warlords' ability to give favors to those who support them.
- Warlords establish alternative governance structure after state collapse.

# Common factors that make up warlordism

- First, warlords take advantage of disintegration of states to control a territory.
- Second, their actions are based on self-interest, not ideology.
- Third, their authority is based on charisma and patronage ties to their followers.
- Fourth, this leads to fragmentation of governance, disrupting free flow of trade.



# **HISTORY OF WARLORDS**

# Warlordism in medieval Europe

- Warlords set separate policies for administration of justice.
- Warlords levied taxes.
- They could protect their populations and merchants from bandits.

# Warlordism in republican China

- Fall of imperial China in 1911 witnessed emergence of self-interested rule by men who used force and charisma to dominate local political economies.
- Warlords were mostly former imperial military officers.
- Warlords gained control over provincial tax collection.

# Warlordism in Somalia

- In early 1990s, anarchy increased number of warlords fighting for territorial control.
- Somalia's warlords gained popular support by using clan identification.
- Areas of the country that had clear clan dominance (Somaliland, Puntland) became most peaceful.
- The rest of country became contested by different warlords. E.g. General Aidid.

# Warlordism in Afghanistan

- Warlords emerged with uprisings against Soviet invasion in 1979.
- Warlords planted opium poppies and levied taxes from travelers.
- These resources allowed warlords to become de facto governors of the districts.
- E.g. Ismail Khan in Herat; Abdul Rashid Dostum in North.

# Warlordism in Afghanistan - 2

- Popular disgust against warlordism in 1990s helped Taliban movement capture territory.
- Some warlords formed Northern Alliance to fight against it.
- Plurality of GDP come from opium trade and cross-border trade that warlords control.
- Elections in September 2005 led warlords to become MPs.

# **OVERCOMING WARLORDISM: ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND TRANSFORMATIVE IDEAS**

# Overcoming Warlordism

- All above cases demonstrate similarity of warlordism as a system of political economy across time and space.
- Warlordism is both harmful and persistent.
- In medieval Europe, republican China, warlordism was eradicated by forces for change.



# **Two factors that led to eradication of warlordism in medieval Europe and republican China**

- (1) emergence of aggrieved domestic interest groups that had strong incentives to take revolutionary action against warlords; and
- (2) emergence of transformative ideas from outside sources about what proper governance entailed.

# Factors that lead to eradication of warlordism

- Ideas help motivate educated class to support those with economic grievances by taking political action against old system.
- These ideas are communicated across public because of literacy, and with the help of propaganda tools that reach the illiterate.
- Thus, “economic grievance” and “spread of revolutionary ideas” are necessary for warlordism to end.

# How warlordism was overcome in medieval Europe?

- Merchants had an incentive to find alternatives to the arbitrary rule of feudal lords.
- These incentives led to coalitions between merchants and kings, who needed to take the power of taxation away from local lords to secure their own rule.

# How warlordism was overcome in medieval Europe? - 2

- Medieval Europe witnessed appreciation of ancient Roman law.
- One of chief stimulants to growth of modern state was growth of educated class and literacy.
- Those ideas came from outside.
- Educated class made common cause with those who held revolutionary economic interests.

# How warlordism was overcome in republican China?

- Triumph of Mao's communism depended on support he gained from Stalin's Soviet Union.
- Warlords were seen to support economic inequality.
- Second factor was emergence of new transformative idea: nationalism imported from West and Japan, helped support goals of anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism.

# **IMPLICATIONS FOR SOMALIA AND AFGHANISTAN**

# **Somalia: economic grievance and outside ideas**

- Economic grievance is available in south, as warlord control disrupted trading patterns.
- Cellphone networks and diaspora have become means for outside ideas to penetrate in Somalia.
- Somalia may thus be ripe for a successful anti-warlord revolution.

# Afghanistan: economic grievance and outside ideas

- There is little economic incentive for merchants to rebel against the warlords, as there are no major sources of income that are independent of warlord control.
- Illiteracy high.
- It does not have cohesive diaspora.
- Prospects for immediate change is slim.



# Conclusion

- Warlordism can end only when people believe that transforming the status quo is worth the cost.

To end warlordism:

- Support economic groups.
- Build communication infrastructure.
- Increase literacy rate.

# Readings for this lesson:

## Must readings:

- Marten, pages: 41-73.

## Optional:

Bryden, pages: 23-38.

# **Terrorism**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
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# Introduction

- 11 Sep 2001 terrorism became at the forefront of the security studies.
- Emergence of 'Global War on Terror'.
- Leading to military interventions with termination of regimes in Afghanistan, Iraq.
- Terrorism is undertaken by non-state actors and by states.

# Terrorism in perspective

- Terrorism results in deaths of thousand people each year (i.e. War).
- Understood as '4<sup>th</sup> World War' or as matter of survival of civilization (3<sup>rd</sup> World War against Soviet Union).
- Some question the centrality of the Terrorism considering other sources of deaths.

# 9/11 as a particular form of terrorism

- Three reasons:
  1. 9/11 was shocking; came as surprise; effects were witnessed live on television.
  2. US from mid-2001 pursued vision of 'New American Century': world would accept American leadership as essential for international security – 'benign imperium'.
  3. Focus on state-centered security in the aftermath: that it is essential to destroy terrorists and any state sponsors.

# Definitions of terrorism

- Short definition : ‘threat of violence and use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention’.
- Political definition : ‘use, or threat of use, of violence by individual or group, when such action is designed to establish extreme anxiety or fear with purpose of forcing that group into accepting political demands of perpetrators’.

# Definitions of terrorism - 2

- US government's definition:  
'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience'.
- This definition does not include state sponsored terror.



# State terror

- State terrorism is far more widespread in its effects:
- Stalin's Soviet Union in 1930s;
- Mao's China in 1950s;
- Colonial powers used terror tactics;
- Latin America in 1960s-1970s.

# **Terrorism divided into two orientations**

1. Terrorism that seeks fundamental change in a state or in society (revolutionary terrorism, based on a political ideology of left or right, or based on religious commitment).
2. Terrorism that seeks particular change for identifiable community (limited international ambitions; separatist; e.g. ETA in Spain, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka).

# **New trends in Terrorism**

## **a. Terrorism and insurgency**

- Terrorism combined with insurgency.
- Practice of regime termination as response to terrorism produced reaction that mixes terrorism with insurgency.
- E.g. Afghanistan, Iraq.

## **b. Internationalism**

- Terrorists becoming able to carry out attacks throughout the world.
- From US, to Middle East, to Europe, to East Asia, to Africa.

## **c. Suicide terrorism**

- Suicide attacks old habit.
- Suicide attacks until 2001 were done by those with deep political or ethnic motives, e.g. Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.
- Current trend is: intensity of suicide attacks and drawing on religious motivation.

## **d. Speed of learning**

- Terrorists forced to learn fast in order to survive and thrive.
- Rapid spread of tactics than in the past.

## e. New media

- Increased use of new media to publicize their actions, causes and grievances.
- Old media (TV, DVD) combined with new media (internet, broadband, cell, 24 hours news media).
- TV coverage of aircraft hijackings in 1960s/1970s brought causes of PLO to world attention.

## **f. Economic targeting**

- After 1990, tendency for some terrorists to target the economy of a target state. E.g. Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; attacks on Iraq and Saudi oil pipelines and facilities.
- Truck bombs by IRA to cause damage in London. This influenced Labor government in 1997 to devote effort to resolve the conflict.



## **e. Mass casualty attacks and weapons of mass destruction**

- Fear of possible use of WMD.

# COUNTERTERRORISM

# Counter-terrorism

- As a concerted and cooperative effort by governments to combat terrorism.
- First international conference on counterterrorism, Rome, 1898.
- Most responses to terrorists employ combination of methods.

# Approaches of counter-terrorism

1. Policing, intelligence and security approach: terrorists detected, detained, brought to justice; improved security is provided to perceived targets (people, facilities).
2. Military action against terrorists: against terrorists and/or their state sponsors.
3. Concentrating on motivations of terrorists and environment from where they draw support.

# Is terrorism a 'crime' or 'war'?

- Terrorism as act is crime.
- Terror's political objectives give it similarity with warfare and distinguish their actions from non-political crimes.
- Arrest of terrorists and their prosecution can: prevent them from committing further attacks; demonstrate governmental resolve; inflicting fear among terrorists that they can get caught.

# Is terrorism a 'crime' or 'war'? - 2

- But, fear is irrelevant to suicide bombers.
- Accused terrorists may use a public trial as a platform for propaganda.
- As terrorists are international, jurisdictional issues complicate application of criminal justice.
- Possible solution can be International Criminal Court (ICC) as a place to prosecute international terrorists.

# Incident management (IM)

- IM means anything done, once a terrorist incident occurs, to mitigate its effects.
- IM first arose in response to attacks in which hostages were seized and their lives were in jeopardy as the terrorists voice demands.
- IM includes communications or negotiations with the terrorists.

# Incident management (IM) - 2

- Expertise developed among police on how best to deal with hostage-takers.
- Objective is to avoid any move that could stimulate action harming the hostages.
- Some governments (e.g. Italy) willing to make concessions; Others (e.g. USA) opposed to concessions on the grounds that they encourage further terrorism.



# Incident management (IM) - 3

- Another aspect of IM is possible use of force to rescue hostages.
- Past failures led to development of forces trained to conduct rescue operations.
- Failures: Israeli athletes at Olympic games, Munich, 1972; USA diplomats, Iran, 1980; Egyptian airliner, 1985, Malta.
- Successes: 1996, Japanese embassy, in Lima, Peru.

# 9/11 response and the War on Terror

- Response to 9/11 was unusual as it placed more emphasis on military action - homeland defense and global War on Terror.
- Military campaigns mounted against state sponsors in Afghanistan and Iraq leading to regime termination.
- Pre-emptive military action against 'axis of evil' (states believed to be developing WMD and sponsoring terrorists (Iran, Iraq, N. Korea)).

# 9/11 response and the War on Terror

## - 2

- US was unable to contain the violence and terrorists were able to develop new techniques to counter.
- Use of overwhelming firepower understood by opponents as terror.
- Iraq was 'mother of all mistakes'.
- Extensive coverage of carnage in Iraq increased support for terrorists.

# 9/11 response and the War on Terror

## - 3

- In global War on Terror, over 100,000 people were detained without trial.
- Prisoner abuse, torture, rendition used (US military base at Guantanamo in Cuba).
- Despite opposition and promises, there was no change in this policy.
- Need to move away from military action towards a policy that recognizes motivations and support for terrorists.

# 9/11 response and the War on Terror

## - 4

- A military attack may serve more to provoke than to deter.
- Military strikes also have their own practical problems, such as access to bases and overflight of third countries.
- Collateral damage, including the loss of innocent lives, is almost inevitable.
- Such damage can alienate civilian populations.

# 9/11 response and the War on Terror

## - 5

- Treatment of suspected terrorists has been a controversy since the 9/11 attacks.
- Controversy comes not from any sympathy for terrorists but from concerns over human rights principle that even the guilty should be treated humanely.
- Another concern is that not all suspects are in fact guilty.

# 9/11 response and the War on Terror

## - 6

- There is unavoidable conflict with two values in particular: liberty (absence of restrictions on daily life) and privacy (avoiding governmental scrutiny of personal matters).
- Liberty is curtailed every time one is denied access to a formerly public place in the interest of security.
- Privacy is compromised when government agencies collect and exploit private data.

# Defense

- Defensive security measures applied at several different levels. E.g. protection of individual sites (office buildings, military bases, embassies).
- Protection provided to high-profile events.
- Personal security given to leaders.
- In the eyes of terrorists, these facilities/people likely to have greater symbolic value as targets.



# Defense of entire systems

- Another defensive measure is security provided to entire systems. E.g. civil aviation.
- Vulnerabilities and mobility of airliners make them terrorist targets.
- No other systems have received as much counterterrorist attention as aviation.
- But also increasingly need for protection to systems such as public transit, electrical power grids, IT systems.

# Defensive countermeasures

- Direct foiling of attempted terrorist attack.
- Defense may deter terrorists from attacking.
- Complicating terrorists' planning slows them down, providing more time in which they might be detected.

# Going on the offence

- Going on offensive means not surrendering the initiative to terrorists and not trying to guess where and how they will strike next.
- Offensive counterterrorism involves use of different tools. E.g. Diplomacy.

# **‘Diplomacy’ as offensive counterterrorism tool**

- Transnational nature of terrorism makes diplomacy important tool.
- Enlisting cooperation of other governments is critical.
- Diplomacy is channel to get another government to arrest suspected terrorist, to raid terrorist cell, or to turn over suspect.
- Diplomacy is means for containing and confronting state sponsors of terrorism.

# **‘Multilateral diplomacy’ as offensive counterterrorism tool**

- Counterterrorist diplomacy can be either multilateral or bilateral.
- Multilateral diplomacy useful in establishing global climate that recognizes terrorism as a shared problem.
- Series of international conventions on terrorism were negotiated over the past 40 years.

# **‘Bilateral diplomacy’ as offensive counterterrorism tool**

- Most practical international cooperation on terrorism is bilateral.
- Handling of secret material is easier under bilateral level.
- Financial control in the form of freezing or seizing of terrorist assets. But terrorist financial flows are hard to detect and most terrorism is cheap.

# **‘Intelligence’ as offensive counterterrorism tool**

- It is hope that intelligence will uncover next terrorist plots to enable the authorities to prevent before they can be executed.
- Terrorists difficult targets for intelligence: terrorists work in small number of operatives, secretly, avoid communications.

# **‘Intelligence’ as offensive counterterrorism tool - 2**

- Intelligence performs three special functions:
  1. To provide strategic sense of terrorist threats: which groups or states pose the greatest dangers?
  2. To provide support to other tools as other tools are based on information collected by intelligence.
  3. To collect and analyze information on terrorists enabling them to be disrupted.



# Targeting sources of terrorism

- A government may promote political and social change to weaken roots of terrorism.
- It can wage battle of ideas against extremist ideologies.
- Increased attention to the status of marginalized groups in the West.

# Targeting sources of terrorism - 2

- Reducing the chance that young members of these communities gravitate towards terrorism.
- Shaping the incentives for terrorists to use peaceful rather than violent means to pursue their objectives.
- But, extremely difficult to divert the group from its violent path.

# Targeting sources of terrorism - 3

- Negotiated resolution can be major source of inducing a group to cease terrorism. E.g. Good Friday agreement, N.Ireland, 1998.
- This peace agreement was instrumental in inducing the leadership of IRA to give up terrorism.

## Readings for this lesson:

Must readings: Williams,  
pages: 171-184.

Optional: Williams,  
pages: 376-388.

# **Cyber Security**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
Epoka University**

# What is cyber?

- Cyber is a space.
- It is similar to land and sea.
- But, a man-made construct.
- Internet is borderless, and cyber attacks are done from everywhere.

# Have you ever been under Cyberattack?

- Nigerian banker intended giving you money (some people reply to that).
- Spam emails with attachments.
- Attempts to change your passwords.
- Others.

# Major Cyberattacks in history

- Russia against US, 1988.
- US against Russia, 1982 (exploding Siberian gas pipeline).
- Russia against Estonia, 1997.
- China against Yahoo, 2009.
- China against US/South Korea, 2009.
- Against Paypal, 2010 (over Wikileaks).



# Major Cyberattacks in history - 2

- US/Israel against Iran, 2010 (nuclear facility in Natanz was infected by Stuxnet, a cyber virus that destroyed 1000 nuclear centrifuges and set back Iran's atomic program by two years, infected over 60,000 computers).
- China against Canada, 2011.
- Against Citigroup, 2011.

# Major Cyberattacks in history - 3

- Against Sony, 2011.
- Anonymous against Church of Scientology (over Tom Cruise interview).
- Against India, 2012.
- Against Israel, 2012.
- Israel against Syria, 2013/5.

# Emergence of cyber threats

- In 1990s IT progressed from modest use in closed networks to development of internet and new access devices.
- In 1990s number of cyber-incidents increased.
- Cyber-threats are not new; viruses were part of cyberspace since early days.

# Emergence of cyber threats - 2

- There was also qualitative increase in cyber-incidents: cyber-security became linked to both terrorism and critical infrastructure protection.

# Importance of cyber threats

- Is the cyber threat Fact or fiction?
- Despite threat scenarios, cyber-threats have not materialised.
- No consensus on answer to how vulnerable societies really are.

# Importance of cyber threats - 2

- Combating cyber-threats became politicized.
- It has also become lucrative business.
- Even though the danger may be exaggerated, it cannot be denied or ignored.

# Construction of new threats

- During Cold War, threats were linked to military capabilities.
- Following CW, 'new' non-military threats moved into security agenda.
- Main difference is quality of uncertainty about new threats: new threats emanate from non-state actors using non-military means.

# Construction of new threats - 2

- Actors of these new threats are difficult to identify; committers of crimes are not distinguishable.
- It poses difficulties for intelligence collection.
- Despite the fact that cyber-threats have not materialized, existence of threats in cyber is constructed.



# Cyber-threats in International Relations

- Discipline of IR was slow to consider cyberthreats.
- Few attempts were made to apply IR theory in analyzing cyberthreats.
- ‘Securitisation’ approach was used to bring cyberthreats as issue into the security domain.

# History of cyberthreats

- Debate started in 1980s when issue was about damaging disclosures of classified information.
- Then was linked to protection of computer data from espionage.
- Later was linked to growing problem of computer crime.

# Critical infrastructure protection

- Survival of the economies depends on protection of electric power, communications, computers (critical infrastructure).
- Threats of 21<sup>st</sup> century continued to physical aspects (terrorism) rather than cyber dimension.

# Context of cyberthreats

- We need to consider the context (information revolution) in which it takes place.
- Some regard Information Revolution as a major driver of change in world politics.
- We are reminded constantly that we live in Information Age (Internet, mobile phones).

# Context of cyberthreats - 2

- We consider that every segment of life is revolutionised and transformed by IT.
- But, significance of information is not a unique to our time.
- What is important is the notion of IT that is 'out of control' and fears of vulnerabilities due to dependency on IT.

# Context of cyberthreats – 3

- Increasing dependence on IT results in a decreasing capacity to control the risk.
- Falling into the trap of over-interpretation and technological determinism.
- Difficulties in grasping true proportions are inevitable, as we are in midst of the process.

# Essential elements of information age

- ‘Information’: Data, Phenomena, facts, events; information cannot be ‘imprisoned’.
- ‘Digital’: Makes information to be easily stored and shared.
- ‘Revolution’: Sudden change; but IT changes are not sudden.
- ‘Cyber’: through the use of a computer.

# 'Complexity'

- Complexity is interdependence plus change.
- Complexity of IT grows with extension of geographical reach, services and users.
- Increasing interdependencies.
- Making IT not fully controllable.



# **‘Complexity’ consequences**

1. IT systems as complex will be struck by accidents that cannot be prevented.
  2. Interactions of complex, decentralized, open systems means that abilities to evaluate the problem will be difficult.
- This leads to ‘national-security uncertainty’ and incoherence in shaping policies.

# Nature of incidents

Events damaging IT infrastructure:

- Failures: caused by deficiencies in elements on which the system depends (software or hardware problems).
- Accidents: randomly occurring and potentially damaging events.
- Attacks: orchestrated by adversary.

# Nature of incidents - 2

- It is difficult to determine whether event is result of failure, accident or attack.
- What is important is the impact of the event.
- Identity of the attacker is crucial for calibrating the right response.

# Actors

- Hackers: actors that carry out their attack using 'cyber' weapons.
- Hacktivism: use of IT attacks for political, social, or religious purposes; attacks with intent of disrupting normal operations but not causing serious damage.

# Kosovo: the first war fought in cyberspace

- 1999, NATO intervention against Serbia marked first use of IT tools in combat.
- During Operation, both sides used IT aspects to harm the enemy.
- Use of internet during the conflict gave it distinction of being 'first war fought in cyberspace' or 'first war on the internet'.

# **Kosovo: the first war fought in cyberspace - 2**

- NATO abstained from bombing Internet service providers as it helped for open access to internet.
- Journalists used the Internet as alternative source of information.
- Both hacking and hacktivism was used.

# Cyber incidents during Kosovo war

- Disruption of NATO server (e-mail spamming attacks, viruses).
- Chinese hackers targeted White House site, which was unavailable for 3 days.
- Serbian hacker group substituted two US government sites with anti-NATO sites, called NATO 'National American Terrorist Organization'.

# Cyber incidents during Kosovo war - 2

- Dutch hacker group broke into Serbian web servers and replaced anti-NATO site with pro-NATO 'Help Kosovo' page.
- Russian hacker groups changed NATO websites.
- Serbian hacker group broke into US Navy computer and deleted data; Navy servers remained temporarily unavailable.



# Cyber incidents during Kosovo war - 3

- NATO penetrated Serbian air defense systems in order to manipulate their radars.
- US computer hackers entered Serbian government e-mail systems to read Belgrade's mind on daily basis.
- It also infiltrated global banking systems in search of accounts held by Milosevic.

# Challenges in cybersecurity

- Criminality becoming online.
- Response to control or regulate would impact the freedom that underlies the IT.
- Globally interconnected IT demonstrates limitations of cybersecurity efforts that are reliant only on government; it requires combined effort by government, industry, population.

# Mechanisms of Cyberspace

- Cyberspace is virtual; not tangible as ground, water, air.
- Cyberspace consists of three layers: physical layer, syntactic layer sitting above physical, and semantic layer sitting on top.
- IT systems rest on physical layer consisting of boxes and wires.

# Physical layer

- Remove the physical layer and the system disappears as well.
- It is certainly possible to attack IT system kinetically.
- But, IT system cannot be put down by destroying its components.

# Syntactic level

- Syntactic level contains protocols through which machines interact (device recognition, routing, document formatting).
- Some IT systems have thicker syntactic layer than others.
- This is the level at which **hacking** takes place.

# Semantic layer

- Semantic layer is information that the machine contains.
- Many hacking tricks insert instructions in the guise of content (E.g. attachments that contain viruses).
- It is possible to attack IT by feeding them false information.

# External Threats

- Cyberattacks can be launched from outside (hackers) or from inside.
- Most common aim of hacking is to steal data.
- When states steal data from other states, it is called *computer network exploitation (CNE)*.
- Individuals/Corporations also steal data.

# External Threats - 2

- Hacking leads to two possibilities: **disruption** and **corruption**.
- Disruption: systems become not functional (effects are obvious).
- Corruption: systems function but generate wrong information or makes bad decisions (effects are not visible in first instance).



# External Threats - 3

- States are vulnerable to download of critical technology designs that cost billions of dollars.
- States are threatened as it provides to hacking states with ideas and designs to arm themselves and achieve parity.
- Cyberattacks erode states' power, status, security, economy.

# Internal threats

- States have two other methods of gaining access to systems.
  1. Insiders.
  2. Supply chains.
- Hacking techniques published on Web.
- Insider methods are confidential and protected.

# Insiders

- Insiders insert mischiefs into the systems.
- Insider threat is important part of computer security in companies and governments.
- Thus, access to some parts of IT systems is limited to some people.

# Supply Chain

- Donation of computers to other nations, through which messages are monitored (Accept IT aid from others?).
- IT devices containing intelligence-sponsored back door.
- IT component manufacturing provides opportunities for countries to gain access to systems.

# Defining Cyberattack

- Cyberattack is deliberate disruption or corruption by one state of a system of another state.
- Former state is referred as attacker; latter is referred as target.
- Target may also become retaliator.
- Is cyberattack an act of war?

# What Constitutes an Act of War in Cyberspace?

- What constitutes an act of war may be defined in three ways: universally, multilaterally, and unilaterally.
- Universally: when every state accepts.
- Multilaterally: if enough nations have signed a treaty that says as much (NATO declared that 2007 attack on Estonia did not merit invocation of Article 5).

# What Constitutes an Act of War in Cyberspace? - 2

- There is no universal or multilateral rule that cyberattack can be considered as actor of a war.
- Unilaterally: a state can unilaterally declare that a cyberattack (of certain characteristics) is an act of war.
- But acting on that declaration is another matter.

# What Constitutes an Act of War in Cyberspace? - 3

- Potential attackers may or may not take such unilateral declarations seriously.
- Nothing compels a state to treat cyberattack as an act of war.
- Answer to whether a cyberattack is an act of war comes down to this: Is it in your interest to declare it so?



# **Stealing data from other states - computer network exploitation (CNE)**

- CNE is not an attack (as disruption and corruption are).
- CNE is distinguished from cyberattack.
  1. CNE does not deprive the user of full use of machine; user suffers no consequential harm other than having secrets stolen.

# Stealing data from other states - computer network exploitation (CNE) - 2

2. As CNE is difficult to detect, deterrence policy can only be activated by exception.
3. Law of war rarely recognizes espionage as *casus belli*.
4. Everyone does CNE; almost all big countries penetrate potential enemies' or friends' computer networks.

# **Stealing data from other states - computer network exploitation (CNE) - 3**

- State-sponsored CNE is ongoing.
- China's PLA is accused of breaking into military systems of other countries in order to steal information.
- Germany's domestic intelligence service discovered cyberattack targeting computers in German ministries in May 2007 by China.

# Attacks by individuals and non-state actors

- Nations vary greatly in their degree of dependence to cyber attacks.
- Attacker without its own IT system is unlikely to be deterred by retaliation.
- This does not mean that cyberattacks by individuals and nonstate actors cannot be deterred by other means (intelligence).

# Attacks by individuals and non-state actors - 2

- Nonstate actors may have Web sites that can be turned off by hacking.
- Or their hosts are persuaded to end their service.
- Terrorist Web sites are prevented in that way.

# Defining Cyberdeterrence

- It is deterrence where state needs to develop a capability to do to others what others may want to do to it.
- States with cyberattack capabilities have interest in cyberdeterrence.
- Retaliation in cyber is more attractive than violent alternatives because cyber raises fewer issues of proportionality.

# Defining Cyberdeterrence - 2

- Aim of deterrence is to establish disincentives for carrying hostile action.
- The target threatens to punish bad behavior but implicitly promises to withhold punishment if there are no bad acts.
- At a minimum, it requires the ability to distinguish good behavior from bad.

# Defining Cyberdeterrence - 3

- Undeserved punishment lacks legitimacy: If presumed attacker is innocent, retaliator may have made a new enemy.
- No punishing guilty weakens deterrence.
- Much depends on likelihood and consequences of getting caught: people avoid crime if they figure that consequence of getting caught exceeds criminal gains.



# Defining Cyberdeterrence - 4

- Deterrence also requires the adversary to be able to distinguish being punished from not being punished.
- If the potential retaliator doubts whether its planned retaliation will have the desired effect, it may be better off pretending that no attack occurred than making a big deal of the attack.

# Defining Cyberdeterrence - 5

- Deterrence in general comes in many forms.
- Some forms are singular, while others have to be repeated.
- Some are asymmetric and some are symmetric.
- Nuclear deterrence is singular and symmetric.

# Defining Cyberdeterrence - 6

- If there is nuclear retaliation, by the time retaliation happens, circumstances underlying the deterrence are likely to have become different (same applies to conventional deterrence).
- Criminal deterrence is repeatable and asymmetric.

# Defining Cyberdeterrence - 7

- Cyberdeterrence is repeatable because cyberretaliation does not eliminate the offending state.
- Thus, a state could attack, suffer retaliation, and live to attack another day.
- Cyber deterrence is symmetric because it takes place among peers.

# Defining Cyberdeterrence - 8

- Target state (potential retaliator) does not, a priori, occupy a higher moral ground than attacker.
- There is no reason to believe that target can win if things go too far.
- Thus, the retaliator always has to worry about counterretaliation.

# Defining Cyberdeterrence - 9

- Cyberdeterrence is not unique in being repeatable and symmetric.
- Such deterrence typically characterizes interactions among quarreling states.
- Deterrence in such situations does not necessarily keep the peace; in an anarchic system, violence is endemic.

# US and cyberdeterrence

- US enjoys superiority in conventional means; and it does not worry much about how others may react.
- This is not the situation in cyberspace; it is also vulnerable.
- As others suffer inferiority in conventional conflict, they feel driven to cyberattacks as a way to score.
- Thus, US might suffer more than adversaries.

# Attacker has advantage in cyber

- Information security is quite expensive.
- Offense-defense curves favor the offense.
- Value of a dollar in *offense* is more than in *security*.
- Attacker had advantage.



# Attraction of cyberdeterrence

- If cyberdeterrence works, it reduces cost of defending systems.
- If attacker is persuaded to abandon its plans, defender can save some money.
- But, hackers are difficult to be deterred.
- And, companies rarely report that they have been hacked.

# Readings for this lesson:

## Must readings:

- Libicki, pages: 11-37.

## Optional:

Cavelty (Cyber Security), pages: 1-23;  
138-144.

Cavelty (Power and Security), pages: ix-  
xiv; 1-12; 151-160.

Hansen, pages: 1155-1175.

# **Sectoral security: energy security, environmental security**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
Epoka University**

# ENERGY SECURITY

# Emerging concern: energy security

- Recent term; emerging priority of foreign policy.
- Key element of domestic policy.
- What is meant by energy security? Why has this gained such prominence now?

# Understanding energy security

- Centrality of energy in human endeavor.
- Richer a society, greater need for energy.
- Not just another commodity; singular importance in economy and way of life.

# Understanding energy security - 2

- Role of private sector: extraction, delivery.
- Role of governments: energy regulatory process.
- When private sector fails, governments must be prepared to step in.

# Definition of 'energy security'

- 'Delivery of adequate and affordable energy to meet vital requirements, including in crisis'.
- 'Reliable and affordable supply of energy' on a continuing, uninterrupted basis.
- Dual function: ensuring procurement and unhindered delivery.



# Definition of 'energy security' - 2

- Demand for energy increases, challenging the task of fulfilling requirements of energy security.
- Energy consumption is expected to grow by 72% by 2030.
- Energy as sum of: oil, gas, coal, nuclear power, hydro-power, wood, coal.

# Definition of 'energy security' - 3

- Overreliance on one source (oil).
- Fossil fuels (oil, coal, gas) leading to climate change.
- Energy security also as mean to diversify energy sources and investing in renewable forms.

# **Major challenge: ensuring unhindered energy delivery**

- Supply system became globalized.
- Existence of fragile networks of delivery, vulnerable to attack by terrorists, pirates, criminals.
- Energy security became protection of global delivery.

# Oil - most important source of energy

- Oil accounted for 38% of world's energy supply in 2003 and to remain so.
- Most states import large share of oil.
- Oil costs will have greater part in national budgets.

## **Oil - most important source of energy - 2**

- Oil supply routes linked with instability and conflict.
- USA alone consumes world's 1/4 of total available energy supply.
- Thus, energy security became major policy concern in USA.

# **Oil - most important source of energy - 3**

- States do not have domestic sources of energy to satisfy their needs.
- State dependent on foreign suppliers, thus exposing to threats of supply interruptions.
- States cannot eliminate their reliance on foreign suppliers.

# Foreign policy dimension

- Objective of diplomacy then becomes to establish friendly ties with providers of energy.
- Often official visits are made to states supplying energy.

# Military dimension

- Protection of overseas energy supply routes (Straits of Hormuz between Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea; Straits of Bosphorus).
- Defend major foreign energy providers (Saudi Arabia) against rival forces.



# Straits of Hormuz



# Carter Doctrine

- ‘Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet forces ... close to Straits of Hormuz, through which most of world’s oil flow ... Attempt by outside force to gain control of Persian Gulf will be assault on vital interests of USA, and such assault will be repelled by ... military force’ (President Carter, 1980).

# Dependency with strategic repercussions

- Energy Security has another meaning for states that are dependent for their energy but also vulnerable to political pressure (Ukraine, Central Asia).
- For them, Energy security means reducing dependency on single provider that can inflict punishment or extract concessions.

# Why now?

- Three developments in energy:
  - (1) fears of slowdown in oil output;
  - (2) shift in oil production from North to South;
  - (3) targeting of oil facilities by insurgents, terrorists, criminals.

# Challenge: oil insufficiency

- Industry is able to satisfy demand (2006, 82.5 million barrels per day, mbd).
- Concern about ability to satisfy future needs:
  1. Many existing oilfields decline.
  2. Demand can climb to levels higher than supply.

# Challenge: oil insufficiency - 2

- Oil demand is expected to rise from 80 mbd in 2003 to 111 mbd in 2025.
- Oil production will rise by similar amount over this period (from 82 to 115 mbd).
- Demand is depended on economic expansion.

# Scepticism regarding oil production capacities

- Many oilfields end their most productive years and experience decline in output.
- This is case for mature oil-fields: Gulf, N.America, East Asia, Siberia, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria.
- Earlier rising oil prices were expressions for this downward assessment.

# Decline in new oilfield discovery

- If supply is to satisfy anticipated demand, we need discovery that is equal to decline in mature fields and added consumption levels.
- Much oilfield discovery was in 1960s; since then, rate of discovery dropped.
- World relies on earlier discovered oilfields, resulting in decline in supply.



# Decline in new oilfield discovery - 2

- New discoveries are in areas that are difficult to tap for environmental, political reasons (sub-Saharan Africa, Gulf of Mexico, Russian Far East).
- Developers (Chevron, Shell, Exxon, BP) prefer to dig fields easy to extract and free of political impediments.

# Shift in the centre of gravity of oil production

- For most of oil era, production was concentrated in North (USA, Canada, Europe, Soviet Union).
- Until 1950s, about 2/3 of worldwide oil production was centered in North.
- As demand grew, consuming states had to rely on providers in South.

# Shift in the centre of gravity of oil production - 2

- South entered energy business later.
- Thus, centre of gravity of world oil production shifted decisively from North to South and will remain there for some time.
- In 1990, North accounted for 39% of oil output; by 2030, its share is to drop to 26%.

# Shift in the centre of gravity of oil production - 3

- South's (Africa, Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf) share is to jump from 31% in 2003 to 48% in 2030.
- Shift in centre of gravity of oil-production has energy security implications for energy-seeking states.
- It entails risk to uninterrupted flow of energy supplies due to disorder in South.

# Shift in the centre of gravity of oil production - 4

- Oil revenues is factor in disputes between government and populations in poor states (Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan).
- Many these states suffer from tendency towards military and corruption rule.
- Oil revenues have powerful attraction for all aspirants to state rule.

# Shift in the centre of gravity of oil production - 5

- Once in power, leaders of 'petro-states' will do everything to remain in power.
- Competitors, after being denied opportunity to win elections, pursue armed revolt to secure their own place.
- Continuous cycle of coups, revolts and counter-coups.

# Oil facilities as a target of attack

- Oil fields viewed by criminals/terrorists as expression of America's (or West's) imperialism in South.
- US presence in oil areas seen as expression of US' 'thirst for oil'.
- US military presence in Middle East has had political implications, leading to resentment by many local inhabitants.

# Oil facilities as a target of attack - 2

- Resentment on close association between western governments and authoritarian regimes in Middle East.
- Presence of US military to protect these regimes and oil installations adds to this resentment.



# Oil facilities as a target of attack - 3

- Oil pipelines and tankers as attractive target.
- Oct 2002 attack on French oil-tanker while sailing off the coast of Yemen.
- Attacks to foreign firms and technicians employed by Saudi Arabia's oil industry (2004, 2006).

# Albania in global energy map

- Pipeline: TAP – Trans Adriatic Pipeline (Gas).
- Oil production: \$583 million, 20,690 barrels per day in 2014, 5.5% of GDP (in Patos Marinza).

# **“Resource curse”**

- Also known as “paradox of plenty”: paradox that countries with abundance of resources, tend to have less democracy outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources.
- Resource curse is not, but affects certain types of countries or regions under certain condition.

# **“1973 oil crisis”**

- Began in Oct 1973 when OPEC proclaimed oil embargo.
- Price of oil rose from \$3 to \$12 barrel.
- Embargo had short-term and long-term effects on global politics and global economy.

# **Case: low prices of energy; how it affects energy security?**

- **Discuss!**

# Strategies for addressing energy (in)security

- Reliance on military force to protect production and flow of oil.
- Development of renewable sources of energy (wind/solar power).
- Maximizing number of oil providers.
- Development of other energy sources:  
Brazil converted sugarcane into ethanol.

# **Discussion shifting from energy security to environmental security**

- Growing popularity of electric automobiles, preference for smaller vehicles, bicycles.
- Energy security acquires new meaning - transition from energy practices that cause climate damage to those that minimize it.

# **ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY**



# Environmental security agenda

- ‘Ultimate security’; ‘Pollution of security proper’.
- It has very short history; Not yet known what kind of political structures environment will generate.
- NGOs, IGOs, epistemic communities emerged, but not yet final due to changes in environmental threats.

# Environmental security agenda - 2

- It started with UN Conf on human environment 1972.
- Two agendas: scientific and political.
- Scientific: research, offering assessment of environmental threats.
- Political: governmental and intergovernmental, offering policies to deal with the threats.

# Environmental security agenda - 3

- Scientific agenda is on securitization.
- Political agenda is on awareness, cooperation, regime formation.
- Scientific agenda is authoritative assessment of threats.
- Political agenda deals with formation of public concern.

# Environmental security agenda - 4

- Scientific argument has most influence in environmental security; scientific proof is in greater demand; science reduces uncertainty.
- Scientific agenda has its own cycle: meeting academic standards.
- Political agenda is shaped by short-term events.

# Environmental security agenda - 5

- Critical for political agenda is not whether threats to environment area real or not, but whether their presumed urgency is political issue.
- Scientific actors will link with political actors in order to establish agenda.
- Advocates overemphasize importance of threats.

# Environmental security agenda - 6

- Securitizing moves can be found in the reports that bridge both agenda.
- It is not actual disasters but their prediction that leads to securitization.
- Concepts *resource scarcity* and *sustainability* have mobilized public concern.

# Environmental security agenda - 7

- In environment there have been dramatic securitizing moves, but with little successful securitization effects.
- Geographic location and level of welfare play decisive roles in determining the ranking of the issue on both agenda.
- Poor countries see environment as luxury.

# Environmental issues

- Disruption of ecosystems: climate change, deforestation, desertification, depletion of ozone layer, pollution).
- Energy problems: depletion of resources, distribution problems.
- Population problems: demographic growth, epidemics, declining literacy rates, urbanization, migration.



# Environmental issues - 2

- Food problems: poverty, famines.
- Economic problems: inequalities.
- Civil strife: environmental degradation.
- No consensus regarding list of issues.
- North emphasizes the role of population issues; South focuses on economic aspects.

# **Referent object in environmental security**

- Two referent objects: Environment and Civilization.
- At stake is maintenance of achieved levels of civilization.
- Thus, environmental security concerns maintenance of planet as essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.

# Security actors in environmental security

- *Lead Actors* have strong commitment to environmental protection (states , epistemic communities, NGOs) and use their power to put issues on agenda or establish regime.
- *Veto actors* (industry associations) play down environmental issues.

# Security actors in environmental security - 2

- *Veto coalitions* (Japan on whaling; China against climate change).
- *Support actors* (poor countries).
- *Functional actors* (industries whose activity is linked to quality of environment; governments who set rules).

# **Security actors in environmental security - 3**

- Leading actors are close to problems geographically.
- Environmental positions are issues specific; not linked with hegemonic power structures.

# Environmental threats

1. Threats to human civilization from natural environment that are not caused by human activity (earthquakes, volcanos).
2. Threats from human activity to planet when changes made do pose threats to civilization (greenhouse gas emissions done via extraction, dumping).

# Environmental threats - 2

3. Threats from human activity to planet when changes made do not pose threats to civilization (depletion of resources).
- Threats under second type are mostly securitized.
  - Threats under first type are also securitized (Netherlands, Alliance of Small Island States against raising sea levels; Japan against earthquakes).
  - Threats are there as humankind is living beyond *carrying capacity* of the earth.

# What to do with threats?

- Economic-Liberal approach questioning whether we should do anything.
- *Periphery against Centre* approach looking to asymmetries in power leading to environmental degradation.
- Threats are securitized when discussion is about causes; not about effects.



# Environmental security effects

- *Acute disasters.*
- *Creeping disasters* – slow deterioration of living conditions (soil erosion, overpopulation).
- Environmental degradation may lead to wars.
- Environment highlights root causes of existential threats.

# Regionalizing dynamics?

- Environmental agenda initially perceived as global.
- Its emergence not result of globalization of local developments, but discovery of global consequences of local practices.
- It affects everyone; it can only be effectively dealt with on the basis of cooperation between all.

# Regionalizing dynamics? - 2

- Many threats require regional actions only.
- Threats in environment are issue specific and rarely universal.
- Causes and effects may be located in different regions.
- Everybody is affected, but not at the same degree (*uneven* effects).

# Regionalizing dynamics? - 3

- Those who have to pay the price of prevention are different from those who have to pay the price of failure.
- Need for securitization in environment can be prevented through politicization – timely management of potential problems can avoid panic politics.

# Maps of regional environmental security complexes

- There are crucial regions with concentrated environmental problems.
- Strong regional dynamics as regional approaches proved more effective.
- Middle East (water); Central Asia (dehydration); Sub-Sahara (population pressure). Regional environmental security complex in Balkans?

# Readings for this lesson:

## Must readings:

Williams, pages: 483-496.

## Optional:

Buzan, pages: 71-92.

# **Human and Societal Security**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
Epoka University**

# HUMAN SECURITY



# Introduction

- Growing attention in IR to Human Security since 1990s.
- Expanding agenda of human security issues (war-affected children, development, racial discrimination, gender, refugees).
- Human security as important as state security.

# Views on “Human Security”

1. Narrower view: Focus on basic human rights.
2. Broader view: economic, environmental, social and other forms of harm to well-being of individuals.
3. Third view: state of global economy, globalization, health of environment.

# **“Human Security” definitions**

- “Absence of threats to core human values, including physical safety of individual”.
- “Safeguarding vital core of all human lives from threats, and to do so without impeding long-term human flourishing”.

# **“Human Security” definitions - 2**

- “Protecting fundamental freedoms”.
- “Protecting people from critical and widespread threats and situations”.
- “Establishing political, social, environmental, economic, systems that together give people building blocks of survival”.

# **“Individual” as referent object**

- It is departure from liberal internationalism that saw order resting on institutional arrangements.
- Referent object for security to be the individual rather than the state.
- International security does not rest solely on states – is also rests on individuals and their security.

# Safety of individual as key to global security

- When safety of individuals is threatened, so too is international security.
- Challenges to be assessed how they affect people, and not just states.
- Threats arise not only from military sources; but also from non-military causes such as environmental conditions and economic inequalities.

# Boundaries of human security

- Problems of definition and boundary-setting in human security research.
- Some apply UNDP's Human Development Index (per capita income, health, education), plus 'political freedom' and 'democracy'.

# Human security as impact of wars

Some measure human security in terms of impact of wars:

- civilian casualties,
- health effects of wars,
- rising crime rates,
- property destruction,
- economic disruption.



# Ongoing debates and unresolved issues

- Globalization with implications to human security.
- Developing countries will have growing income inequality and severe environmental pressures.
- Rising income inequalities contributing to civil unrest.

# Ongoing debates and unresolved issues - 2

- Human security is invoked in humanitarian interventions: whether force should be used in support of human security objectives?
- Collision between human security priorities in different cultures.
- Human security is mainly developed in North rather than in South.

# Individuals principal victims of insecurities

- Trafficking, terrorism, migration, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction.
- Physical security of non-combatants.
- Preventable diseases, injury.
- Illiteracy, lack of access to education.
- Poverty and inequalities.

# Human security risk assessment

- Each human security challenge has its own costs and probabilities.
- There are both short and longer term consequences of challenges.
- E.g. Mortality or poverty rates.
- Necessity of dealing with root causes of risks rather than reacting to consequences.

# Human security risk assessment - 2

- Not absolute poverty, but relative poverty matters most.
- Economic development critical to sustaining peace in post-conflict countries.
- People tend to discount risks they consider controllable, while exaggerate risks they think are uncontrollable.

# Governance and human security

- Consensus that institutions such as state, interstate, nonstate perform inadequately.
- Limited adaptations by IFIs to human security agenda.
- Call made 'to construct structures for global governance' and to 'shift emphasis from state security to human security'.

# Governance and human security - 2

- Landmines Convention; Rome Statute demonstrated possibilities to advance human security.
- Refugees: shift in emphasis at UNHCR away from legal asylum issues, towards human security.
- Current inadequacies of governance in some critical human security areas.

# Towards a theory of human security

- Difficulty in grounding human security in theory or methodology.
- Realism is hostile to human security.
- Some scholars turned to critical theories and constructivism to address human security questions.



# Towards a theory of human security - 2

- Constructivism shares assumptions with human security approaches (threats are constructed, not inevitable, they can be altered).
- Feminism addresses human security issues.

# **SOCIETAL SECURITY**

# What is societal security?

- Nation or society as a security sector.
- Not always state and society is coterminous (E.g. Roma, Kurds).
- State is spatial, but society often transcends spatial dimension.

# What is societal security? - 2

- Society is about identity (identity security), which often is distinct from state.
- Societal is not related to *social security* nor to individual identity.
- But it relates to communal identities.

# Threats to societal security

- Migration: shift in composition of population (Chinese migration in Tibet).
- Horizontal competition: fears of being overridden by other dominant nations (Canadians by Americans).
- Vertical competition: integrationist (e.g. EU) or secessionist attempts (e.g. Catalonia).
- Depopulation: extermination, diseases.

# Reactions to societal threats

- Placing into political agenda.
- Non-state means used by smaller minorities.

# Referent objects and Security actors

- “We”: village, clan, region, state, nation, religion, civilization, ethnic group, race.
- Actors: media, leaders.

# Vulnerabilities

- Admission of foreigners (Finland).
- Fertility rate (Latvia, Macedonia).
- Influx of new culture (Iran).
- English language (France).
- Racism (South Africa).
- Nationalism (Belgium).



# Regionalization dynamics

- Africa: emergence of non-state identities.
- Latin America: inter-regional threats.
- North America: white-dominance; native Americans; demography in favour of hispanics.
- Europe: minorities; EU; migrants.

# Regionalization dynamics - 2

- Middle East: overarching identities (Sunni, Arab).
- South Asia: inter-state conflict (India-Pakistan); ethnoreligious identities.
- Southeast Asia: Chinese presence; alternative model to West.
- East Asia: intra-regional rivalries.
- Former Soviet Union: Russian minorities.

# Readings for this lesson:

Must readings:

**Williams, pages: 229-243.**

Optional:

**Buzan, pages: 119-139.**

# **Alliances and Regional security institutions**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
Epoka University**

# ALLIANCES

# Introduction

- “Alliance” as a key term of IR.
- Alliances as part of institutionalization.
- Historically, states have formed and acted under alliances.
- Alliance diplomacy as part of foreign policy.

# Alliances as policy

- Alliances as instrument for advancing state's interests and state's security.
- For some states, alliances are only option.
- Alliances as response to dangers and to management of interdependencies.
- Alliances as determinant of outbreak, spread and results of conflicts.

# History of Alliances

- Alliances common in modern history.
- Some 648 alliances between 1815-2003.
- Most alliances were small (average number of members - 3).
- European states often in alliances: UK, FR, DE, Austria-Hungary, IT, Russia account for 1/4 of all alliance memberships during that period.



# Definitions: What is an alliance?

Broad view:

- “formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states”.
- “bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some element of security to signatories”.

# Problems with broad definition of alliances

1. So expansive as to include all security arrangements between states.
- Blurring distinction between alliances and collective security arrangements.
- *Alliances* are outwardly oriented - to enhance security vis-à-vis external parties.
- *Collective security arrangements* and *arms control agreements* are designed to enhance security of members vis-à-vis each other.

# Problems with broad definition of alliances - 2

2. Failure to distinguish between various forms of security cooperation.
  - Embracing all alliances that might be limited to supportive diplomacy or economic aid with security objectives.
  - Alliances are distinguished from other security arrangements in their emphasis on military forms of assistance.

# Restrictive definitions

- ‘Associations of states for use of military force in specified circumstances against outside states’.
- These definitions exclude number of agreements treated as alliances: pledges by states to refrain from engaging in aggression against one another, promises to remain neutral in a military conflict, commitments to consult in event of crisis.

# Types of Alliances

- Defensive alliances, offensive alliances, non-aggression pacts, neutrality pacts, consultation agreements.
- High percentage of alliances consist of two or more types.
- Offensive alliances are relatively rare and short-lived.
- Others have been defensive or offensive-defensive combined.

# Explanations of alliance persistence and collapse

- Of 263 defensive alliances mean duration was 13.4 years.
- 42 of defensive alliances are alive.
- Recent alliances tend to last longer than earlier ones.

# Factors that cause alliances to collapse

One factor is major war.

- Of 40 alliances formed before 1870, only two outlived wars of German unification.
- Only 2 alliances in existence before WWI remained after WWI.
- Only 5 alliances formed before WWII remained after WWII.

# Theories of alliance formation

- As long as factors that caused alliance to form remain in place, then the alliance will endure.
- Should those conditions change, alliance may fall apart.
- States can freely join alliances.



# Theories of alliance formation - 2

- Alliance membership has costs and benefits.
- Costs are loss of autonomy.
- Most relevant theories of alliance formation are two categories: those that emphasize international determinants and those that focus on domestic factors.

# **International determinants: capabilities aggregation models**

Realism or capabilities aggregation models:

- States form alliances to balance the power of other states.
- Unbalanced power represents threat to survival of less powerful states.
- Thus, two or more weak states, when confronted with powerful state, will ally.

# **International determinants: capabilities aggregation models - 2**

- Shifts in international distribution of power threaten alliances.
- States form alliances in response to common threats, not just power.
- How threatening a state is, relates to its geographical proximity, its offensive capabilities, aggressiveness of its intentions.

# **International determinants: capabilities aggregation models - 3**

- Decline in threat posed by adversary will cause alliance to weaken or dissolve.
- States may use alliances to manage, constrain and control their partners.
- If ally that the alliance is intended to contain becomes too threatening or too powerful to manage, then alliance will not survive.

# Domestic determinants

- Threat perception also depends on internal characteristics of states.
- Similarities and differences in culture, ideologies and institutions of states.
- States will tend to ally with states whose political orientations are similar. E.g. liberal democracies with liberal democracies.

# Domestic determinants - 2

- Forming alliance with like-minded states may enhance domestic legitimacy of weak regime by suggesting that it is part of broader movement.
- Alliances among liberal democratic states are resilient due to stability of public preferences and continuity of national leadership.

# Alliance institutionalization

- Some alliances have institutional characteristics from outset.
- Some get institutionalized over time, with implications for their staying power.
- Two dimensions of institutionalization:
  1. Alliances may develop intergovernmental organizations to facilitate cooperation among members.

# Alliance institutionalization - 2

- Such bureaucracies are also actors in their own with some degree of autonomy and interest in perpetuating themselves.
  - They may resist change; they may try to manage change by promoting modifications in alliance's roles and missions.
2. Alliances may contain or acquire institutional capabilities that can be used for tasks beyond those for which they were originally designed.



# Alliance institutionalization - 3

- Institutionalized Alliances last longer.
- Of 263 defensive alliances, 70 had permanent bureaucracy; 28 had military command; 63 called for official contact among national militaries.
- Degree of alliance institutionalization increased over time, suggesting greater longevity of alliances.

# Alliance socialization

- Socialization helps alliance longevity.
- Socialization can lead to similar worldviews and common identity.
- Socialization mechanisms: substantial contacts among elites through regular meetings; seconded personnel; international civil servants may actively seek to cultivate sense of community.

# Case: NATO after Cold War

- NATO as one of longest lived alliances.
- 1949 North Atlantic Treaty does not refer to any adversary, but implicitly it referred to Soviet Union.
- Some members viewed NATO alliance as insurance policy, provided by USA.
- Purpose of NATO: to keep Russians out, Americans in, and Germans down.

# Institutionalization of NATO

- NATO's initial organization was modest (only council and defense committee).
- After Korean War, 'O' was put in NATO.
- International staff, secretary general, military committee, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

# Institutionalization of NATO - 2

- In 1960s, France withdrew from alliance's military structures, causing transfer of NATO's headquarters to Belgium.
- NATO's persistence during Cold War is due to threat posed by Soviet Union.

# NATO's post-Cold War persistence

- NATO survived Cold War.
- It added new members from 12 to 28.
- Out of area operations: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan.
- Article V of treaty (collective defence, was invoked for first time after 9/11, 2001.

# NATO's post-Cold War persistence - 2

- Some argue that NATO is no longer alliance; it is transformed into regional collective security arrangement or security management institution.
- International determinants of alliance persistence:
  1. Residual threat posed by remnants of Soviet Union.

# **NATO's post-Cold War persistence - 3**

2. Emergence of new threats -  
instability and bloody civil conflicts  
near NATO's borders; terrorism.
3. Continuing intra-alliance function  
that NATO played in ensuring friendly  
relations among its members.



# NATO's post-Cold War persistence - 4

- NATO as tool for political reform (Enlargement).
- NATO as enforcement arm of UNSC.
- Types of factors that are likely to be determinative: presence or absence of threats; ability to adapt NATO's institutions so that they can continue to address threats.

# NATO's challenges

1. Growing divergence in security concerns facing NATO members (anti-Russian and pro-Russian; old and new Europe).
2. Emergence of new threats that may not be best addressed by NATO (terrorism).
3. Existence of promising institutional alternatives, especially for European members of NATO.

# REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

# Regional security institutions

- Prior to WWII, only security institution was League of Nations.
- Later, impressive rise of new institutions.
- By end of 20<sup>th</sup> century, over 25 included commitment to security provision.

# Major regional institutions with security provision, 1945–2007

- Africa: AU, ECOWAS, SADC.
- Europe EU, WEU, NATO, Warsaw Pact, OSCE, CIS.
- Asia: ASEAN, ARF.
- Middle East: GCC, ECO.
- Americas: OAS, MERCOSUR.
- Australasia: ANZUS.

# Security activities of regional institutions

- Confidence-building measures. Collective defense. Peacekeeping. Peaceful settlement of disputes. Resolution of border disputes. Disarmament and arms control. Preventive diplomacy. Freedom, security and justice. Combating terrorism, drugs and weapons trafficking. Peace enforcement. Non-proliferation.

# Regionalism in security affairs

- Regional organizations increasingly involved in peacekeeping/peacemaking activities with UN.
- Institutions shaped way states think about security and community.
- But, promotion of regional security contradicts search for global security.

# Regionalism in security affairs - 2

- Regional institution as attempt to promote peace and to build security and community through cooperation.
- Some regional security institutions' charters have references to security.
- Security provision is designed to meet threats arising from inter and intra-state conflicts.



# Three types of early regional institutions

1. Multipurpose institutions (Organization of American States or African Union);
  2. Those with economic focus (EU); and
  3. Security alliances (NATO).
- Not all regional economic institutions have security provision, nor do all regional security institutions have provision for economic cooperation.

# Three broad waves of institutional growth from 1945-present

1. Early Cold War period – first wave:  
1945–1965, Multi-purpose institutions: OAS, AU; Security institutions: NATO, Warsaw Pact, WEU.
2. Mid-late Cold War – second wave:  
1966–1986, Subregional institutions: ASEAN, ECOWAS; Pan-regional institutions: CSCE.

# Three broad waves of institutional growth from 1945-present - 2

3. Post-Cold War era - third wave: 1987  
– present, New institutions: CIS;  
Renamed institutions/new agenda:  
CSCE/OSCE, EC/EU, OAU/AU.
- For each wave, institutional growth correlates with change in international system.

# **Systemic changes as basis for each wave in regional security institutions**

- First was end of WWI (construction of League of Nations; it failed as security institution).
- Second was end of WWII (UN).
- Last major systemic change was end of Cold War.

# Regional security institutions in Cold War

- UN Charter endorsed regional organizations, but within framework of global security organization.
- Article 51 endorses right of states to collective self-defense; in Article 52, regional agencies are called upon to ‘make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes’.

# First wave regional security institutions

- Early general-purpose organizations are regarded as failures.
- Unable to foster regional security.
- Their regions suffered from civil wars and external intervention.

# **First wave regional security institutions - 2**

- Institutions had early role to play in assisting 'weak in world of strong'.
- Most successful regional security institutions: Warsaw Pact and NATO.
- These security alliances offered little scope for work of regional organizations.

# First wave regional security institutions - 3

- USA established regional security organizations to serve Cold War purposes: in Southeast Asia (SEATO), Middle East (Baghdad Pact/CENTO) or Australasia (ANZUS).
- Cold War security on periphery was achieved through bilateral alliances. E.g. Japan bilateral security treaty with USA.



# Second wave of regional security institutions

- 1966 - 1986.
- Mostly sub-regional in scope, but also pan-European institution, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
- Many had more economic functions - GCC designed to meet security threat whose charter focused on economics.

# **Second wave of regional security institutions - 2**

- Many were constructed with particular local threat in mind: for ASEAN it was Vietnam, for GCC, Iran; for SADCC, apartheid South Africa.
- Institutional survival rates were high – few institutions died.
- They were also flexible – many expanded their security roles.

# **Third wave - regional security institutions after Cold War**

- Expansion of regional security projects.
- Regional security became vulnerable and accessible to local actors ('regional security complex').
- End of Cold War era gave space also for global institutions and projects ('New World Order'; 'Clash of civilizations').

# **Third wave - regional security institutions after Cold War - 2**

- EU developed CFSP, ESDP.
- Euphoria regarding revival of UN; but it lacked resources, leading to vacuums that regional institutions sought to fill in.
- New wave of security regionalism understood in terms of UN capacity and relative disinterest of great powers in external interventions.

# **Third wave - regional security institutions after Cold War - 3**

- It represented development of self-help system for weaker states to cope with new security environment.
- Upgrading of security provision in existing institutions and establishing new ones.
- Only few regions did not participate in this new wave.

# **Third wave - regional security institutions after Cold War - 4**

- New institutions were formed in Asia-Pacific, former Soviet space.
- China entered into regional arrangements.
- CSCE was changed into OSCE; move from informal conference to formal organization (comprising 56 states - as largest regional security organization in world, followed by African Union).

# **Third wave - regional security institutions after Cold War - 5**

- NATO enlarged and engaged in 'out-of-area' operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan.
- Former Soviet bloc was institutionalized (CIS).
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 2001, (successor to Shanghai Five).

# **Third wave - regional security institutions after Cold War - 6**

- 1992 expansion of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) to include Afghanistan and six Muslim republics of former USSR.
- 1994, establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
- 1991, AU established mechanisms for conflict management.



# **Third wave - regional security institutions after Cold War - 7**

- 1990s - ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, CEMAC assumed security roles.
- MERCOSUR included commitments to peace.
- OAS made link with security.
- CARICOM established Regional Task Force on Crime and Security to address security issues.

# Readings for this lesson:

Must readings:

Williams, pages: 291-323.

# **Peace studies and Peace operations**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
Epoka University**

# PEACE STUDIES

# Introduction: What is peace studies?

- Central concern of peace studies is reduction and eradication of war; resolution of violent conflict by peaceful means.
- Peace studies' key focus is definition of peace.
- War as a problem in need of eradication.

# Efforts to eradicate the war

- 1919 League of Nations.
- 1928 Kellogg– Briand Pact – outlawing the war.
- 1955 Russell–Einstein Manifesto - calling upon world leaders to seek the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

# Peace research as science

- Peace research emerged in 1950s in USA, Europe (UK, Scandinavia).
- Early focus was on analysis of war.
- 1959, founding of International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO).
- 1964, founding of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden.

# Johan Galtung

- Driving force behind peace research: Johan Galtung.
- Galtung was inspired by medicine's professional ethics (Hippocratic oath).
- Peace as “Absence/reduction of violence of all kinds”.
- Peace as “Nonviolent and creative conflict transformation”.



# Johan Galtung - 2

- Peace research's field of identification: 'world problems in a world perspective'.
- Object domain: 'global social system'.
- Research focus: 'human survival'.

# Positive and negative peace

- Negative peace: 'absence of war and actual physical violence'.
- Positive peace: 'integration of human society'; 'contributing to structural change that will embed non-violence in the system'.

# Positive and negative peace - 2

- Limiting capacity to limit recourse to violence would only produce negative peace.
- Encouraging human capacity to cooperate would realize a condition of positive peace.
- Together, they would produce 'general and complete peace'.

# “Structural violence”

- Galtung later argued that peace research should focus on *structural* determinants of conflict (that arose out of economic, social and political inequalities).
- ‘Structural violence’: ‘violence is built into structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances’.

# **“Structural violence” - 2**

- Galtung argued that both Liberal and Marxist political systems produced structural violence: former through economic inequality and latter through unequal distribution of political power.

# “Cultural violence”

- For Galtung, West is narrative that dominates aspects of social life resulting in dominance of single narrative of intellectual and social practice.
- Galtung’s West is exclusionary, hierarchical, and as a poor source of peace thinking.
- It is a key but by no means the only practitioner of cultural violence.

# PEACE OPERATIONS

# Introduction

- As part of intentions to bring about peace.
- Peace operations are ill-defined, have various purposes, and are undertaken by range of actors (CIS, AU, UN, NATO, EU).
- Circumstances and nature of peace operations changed since Cold War.



# Language and meaning

- Some peace operations may bring respite from conflict and some interventions may make matters worse.
- Some operations deployed where there is no peace to secure, where ceasefires break down or where war continues.
- ‘Peacekeeping’ as part of broader ‘peace operations’.

# Categories of peace support operations

1. Conflict prevention: Identifying causes of conflict and preventing its occurrence.
2. Peacemaking: Securing via diplomacy a ceasefire or peace settlement.
3. Peacekeeping: Military forces and police operating with host consent to underpin peace settlement or ceasefire.

# Categories of peace support operations - 2

1. Peace enforcement: Force used to get compliance with agreements, impose peace or protect civilians.
2. Peacebuilding: Support to long-term regeneration of war-torn societies and for establishing sustainable peace through institution-building.

# Surge, retraction, resurgence

- Pattern of UN deployments changed after 1990s.
- In 1993, UN was deploying 78,444 uniformed personnel (mostly in Balkans).
- By late 1990s number of UN personnel on operations fell to below 15,000.

# Surge, retraction, resurgence - 2

- UN had found it difficult to adjust to demand for peace enforcement due to lack of resources.
- In 2007, UN was deploying 80,368 personnel in 15 missions.
- Only US has greater global deployment than UN.

# Surge, retraction, resurgence - 3

- Of 112 contributing countries, main suppliers are: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India.
- In 2007, New Zealand had only one soldier on UN service, Australia 9, Canada 15.
- US, UK were engaged in non-UN warlike operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

# Reforms

- In 1997, UN SG stated that without sufficient resources or political will, ad hoc coalitions of 'the willing' would be most effective mechanism for enforcement missions.
- 'Cooperation with regional organizations will be intensified and regional organizations will increasingly become partners of UN in activities related to maintenance of international peace and security'.

# Brahimi's report

- UN forces must be able to defend themselves effectively.
- Peacekeeping needed to be more flexible and robust.
- Far more consultation with troop contributors.
- Mandates would need to reflect the resources available.



# **“Peace Operations 2010” goals**

- Safety of mission personnel: in period 1948-1992, there were 925 fatalities; in period 1993-2007 there were 1,454.
- UN five-year plan, Peace Operations 2010, had five goals related to personnel, doctrine, cooperation with other bodies, resources and integrated structures.

# Hybrid operations

- UN has no monopoly in peace operations.
- Regional institutions are involved as well.
- International military administration of Shkodër, Albania, 1913-1914; Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai after Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty of 1979; NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia; NATO's KFOR in Kosovo; EU's EUFOR in Bosnia; ECOWAS, AU operations; CIS troops in Tajikistan; Australian-led missions in Pacific.

# Hybrid operations - 2

- Some regional organizations are either not politically willing to conduct multilateral missions (Asia and Southeast Asia) or do not have resources to do so.
- Peace operations are responsible for decline in deadly civil conflicts.

# Readings for this lesson:

Must readings:

**Williams, pages: 73-88.**

Optional:

**Williams, pages: 407-420.**

# **Organized crime and Migration**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

**Dr. Islam Jusufi  
Epoka University**

# **ORGANIZED CRIME**

# Organized Crime

- As rising security threat.
- Direct challenge to state, usurpers of state authority, threats to well-being of people.
- Signing of UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.
- Spreading corruption, fuelling conflict, exacerbating poverty.

# Transnational criminal organizations

- ‘comprising three or more members who are organized to commit serious crime for obtaining financial or other benefit’.

Two forms of criminal organizations.

- Mafias - crime groups that sell private protection and often assume quasi-governmental roles within society.
- Other groups similar to international businesses, acting to acquire illicit profits.



# Fight against Sicilian mafia

- 1992, Mafia assassinated Italian prosecutors; Mafiosi were arrested.
- Later, mafias lost their grip on society.
- In recognition, signing ceremony for UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was held in Palermo, home of Mafia.

# Crime groups compared

- Increasingly, crime groups adopted networked form of organization that is less hierarchical.
- Growing links between crime groups and terrorists.
- Ethnic labels used to catalogue transnational criminal organizations. E.g. Russia mafia, Colombian cartels.

# Big three: drugs, people and arms

- Forced labor, small arms and illicit drugs as three largest illicit markets globally.
- Trade in illicit drugs is largest sector of the illicit political economy.
- 2006, 200 million users of illicit drugs on annual basis.

# Trafficking in persons

- Trafficking in persons is second largest transnational criminal enterprise globally.
- Trafficking as recruitment and movement of people for purpose of slavery or slave-like practices.
- It is estimated that between 600,000 and 800,000 persons are trafficked on annual basis.

# Wide world of crime

- Illicit arms trade estimated at \$1 billion per year.
- Stolen cars from Western Europe are resold in the Balkans.
- Other smuggling: migrants, alcohol, cigarettes, antiques, trade in diamonds, software, kidnapping, hijacking, document fraud, contract killing, hacking.

# Money laundering and corruption

- Origins and destinations of money are not clear.
- Transformation of criminal profits into seemingly licit funds.
- Banking regulations make it difficult for anyone to deposit or draw upon large sums of money without clear statement of funds' origins.

# Dark side of globalization

- Spread of transnational criminal activities tied to globalization (spread of informal economy as a form of resistance).
- Globalization concentrating capital into fewer hands.
- Unable to find legal means to acquire the capital, people turn instead to criminal activities.

# Transnational crime as a security issue

- Transnational criminal groups weakens power of states. E.g. transnational crime drains tax revenues while forcing the state to dedicate more resources to law enforcement.
- States implicated with corruption loose trust and authority in international system.



# Transnational crime as a security issue - 2

Crime impacts on security at three levels:

- At international level: crime undermines norms and institutions.
- At national level: crime destabilizes internal cohesion of the state and undermines power.
- At human level: crime can have profound impact on human security.

# International security

- Given the fact that transnational crime groups operate across borders, states cannot fight these groups alone.
- Fight against transnational organized crime is thus by definition issue of international security.
- The trade in blood diamonds has prolonged conflicts in Africa.

# National security

- Crime groups contribute to decline of sovereignty and authority of states.
- Rise of sovereign-free actors that challenge the ability of states.
- Crime groups contribute to atmosphere where state is unable or unwilling to execute regulatory functions, allowing market or private actors to handle them.

# National Security - 2

- Leading to breakdown of trust and legitimacy publics have in states.
- It can also undermine a state's economic resources - enforcing protection rackets stifle the growth of new businesses.
- Smuggling and laundering undermine state's ability to regulate flows of goods and services.

# Human security

- Criminal enterprises can impact upon the health and wellbeing of individuals.
- Arms smuggling prolongs and intensifies conflicts.
- Contract killings and blood feuds can foment vicious cycle of violence in society.
- Establishing insecurity on society.

# Responses to transnational crime

- Response to transnational organized crime has come from multiple sources.
- At international level: international and regional organizations formed to coordinate the fight.
- At national level: states focused on unilateral and multilateral measures to counter transnational crime.

# Responses to transnational crime - 2

- UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC); International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol); Financial Action Task Force; International Organization for Migration; Europol; SECI Centre.
- Establishment of prohibition regimes.

# Responses to transnational crime - 3

Responses at national level focused on two mechanisms.

- Harmonizing legislation and building institutional capacity.
- Joint construction of law enforcement capabilities.
- Public–private partnerships.
- Cooperation with banks; NGOs.



# MIGRATION

# **Increase in migration due to several factors**

1. State control is matter of concern to at least two states.
2. Rapid increase in world's population.
3. Globalization made people aware of differing opportunities in other parts of world.
4. Turmoil and uncertainty play role in motivating people to move.

# Migration from Albania

- Albania one of the most rapidly migrating countries in Europe.
- Migration is reshaping Albania: altering the composition of populations; de-population; urbanisation; old-age dependency ratios; changes in expenditures in socio-economic services.
- Significant percentage of households has one or more members working abroad (1.4 million).

# Albania's migration

- Migration involved all classes of people; urban and rural; males outnumbered females; mostly young; married.
- Higher level of educated and unemployed have been positively correlated with migration; farmers have been least migrating.
- Remittances estimated to be 11% of GDP.
- Remittances functioned as mechanism for alleviating poverty.

# Migration's benefits

- Sending countries benefit from remittances, and from easing of pressure on employment.
- Receiving country benefits from availability of labor, increasing productivity and economic growth.
- Migrants benefit from better standards of living.

# Migration as a security issue

- Can facilitate terrorism: 11 September 2001 caused by migrants.
- Increasing security focus on migration.
- Migration can pose threat to people and governments of both sending and receiving states, and to relations between these two countries.

# Migration as a security issue - 2

- It can turn civil wars into international conflicts.
- It can cause spread of conflict from one country to another.
- Migration can threaten cultural identities and social cohesion.

# Migrations categorized

International migrations divided into two:

1. Involuntary or forced (refugee);
2. Voluntary or free (economic migration).

Voluntary migration subdivided into three:

1. Legal permanent settler migration.
2. Legal temporary migration.
3. Illegal migration.



# States' authority as regards migrant entry

- On voluntary migration, states have authority to decide who to accept.
- In involuntary or refugee movements, there are constraints on state's authority (obligations imposed by 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees).
- This Convention obliges states to extend asylum to those facing persecution.

# States' authority as regards migrant entry - 2

- None of these agreements or practices guarantees right to refugee status, only the right to seek it.
- Question of whether someone is a refugee becomes issue decided by government and courts of the country.
- For an asylum seeker to be recognized as a refugee is a political decision.

# Migrations and violent conflict

- Refugees carry instability with them to host country.
- Refugees are both consequence of conflict and cause of conflict between country of origin and receiving state.
- Receiving state will try to bring about a change in the situation in sending country.

# Migrations and violent conflict - 2

- By strengthening a refugee group, receiving country takes chance that it will lose its ability to deal independently with sending country, and that refugees will attempt to determine the host country's policies towards sending country.
- Conflicts caused by refugees can be protracted.

# Diaspora

- Consequence of migration is establishment of ethnic minority communities in receiving countries.
- Existence of these communities has impact on security and on relationship of host states with countries from where these communities originate.
- Diasporas maintain strong connection with their home countries.

# Diaspora - 2

- Diaspora become involved in activities targeted at their home country.
- They will use all means at their disposal to influence events at home.
- They will try to enlist support of host government to further their aims.

# Diaspora - 3

- Deterioration in the relationship between the host and home states.
- Migrant communities may also be used by government of home country to pursue its own aims vis-à-vis host country.
- Host governments too will try to use diasporas to achieve their own goals.

# Migrations and internal security

- Migrants cause resentment and hostility.
- Migrants are also perceived to be criminals.
- Migrants as threat to culture, welfare policies.
- Resurgence of the extreme right in politics.
- Increasingly hard line on immigration.



# Readings for this lesson:

Must readings:

Williams, pages: 453-482.

# **Arms trade, Nuclear proliferation, Private security**

**PIR 132, Introduction to International  
Security**

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# **ARMS TRADE**

# Arms trade as independent variable

- Arms trade is linked to peace, security, justice, development.
- They can serve as an independent variable fuelling conflict.
- They provide repressive regimes with the tools they need to commit human rights abuses.
- They can be used to facilitate terrorist acts.
- They can fuel technological growth or undermine economic development.

# Rationales for arms trade

- Dynamics of global arms trade changed over past decades: from Cold War to War on Terror.
- Rationales for trade ranges from 'geo-politics' (cementing relations with strategic allies) to 'geo-economics' (securing deals to subsidize defense industries).
- These shifting justifications mirror changing global circumstances.

# Three channels for arms transfers

Global arms trade is composed of 3 elements:

1. Trade in major systems such as tanks, warships;
2. Trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), from AK-47s to shoulder-fired missiles;
3. Trade in 'dual-use' items with both civilian and military applications.

# Incentives for arms trading

- Major arms manufacturing states (five permanent members of UN Security Council), control between two-thirds and three-quarters of all global weapons sales (In 2005, they accounted for 84% of total global arms sales agreements).
- There are economic incentives for pursuing these deals: generate revenues, profits; contribute to balance of trade; provide jobs.

# Incentives for arms trading - 2

- Politics and security also play important role.
- During Cold War, USA used arms exports to cement relationships with key allies.
- Soviet Union provided military aid: supporting national liberation movements (South Africa, Angola, Central America), courting nationalist regimes (Egypt, India).



# Channel of arms transfers

1. Exports or military aid.
2. Supply of dual-use items: dual-use transfers generally involve arms-making technology rather than finished weapons.
3. Trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). (Vast majority of combat deaths are inflicted with these systems).

# SALW

- SALW are easy to maintain and transport, relatively cheap to purchase, hard to track.
- They are the weapons of choice for terrorists, separatist movements, militias, warlords and other nonstate groups.
- These weapons are used to capture territory and control more resources.

# Arms sales take-off: 1970s and 1980s

- Weapons exports really took off in 1970s and 1980s, when total value of global trade increased threefold.
- Nixon Doctrine: elaborated in 1969 speech in Guam in which it was announced that from there forward it would be US policy to arm allies to protect US security interests rather than sending US troops to confront those threats directly.

# Oil as driving force in increase in arms sales

- Major factor driving increase in arms sales was rise in oil prices in 1970s.
- Oil revenues led to purchasing power that was used by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other oil-exporting states to purchase fighter planes and combat vehicles.
- Arms sales involved also training and technology needed to produce comparable systems.

# **‘Recycle Petrodollars’**

- Economic incentives to export arms rivalled geopolitical drivers during this period.
- Western powers felt need to ‘recycle petrodollars’: to recapture monies spent to purchase oil by selling weapons systems to oil-exporting states.
- Increased arms sales led to alternative market for defense industries that faced declining national defense spending.

# Attempt to restrain arms transfer

- President Carter tried to promote a policy of arms sales restraint and that transferred arms is be used for defensive purposes.
- But, later President Carter's own commitment to restraint waned as he warmed to idea of using arms transfers as tools to reward friends and intimidate adversaries.
- US arms transfer to China and to Shah regime in Iran continued despite the repressive character of his regime.

# Attempt to restrain arms transfer - 2

- Carter administration offered arms to states in Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa in exchange for access to military facilities in order to ensure that there would be 'no more Irans' and 'no more Afghanistans' in Persian Gulf.
- Carter's greatest foreign policy achievement - Camp David peace accords between Israel and Egypt - was sealed with multibillion-dollar military aid package for each party.

# Reagan era: boost to arms transfers

- President Reagan sold Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes to Saudi Arabia in value of \$9 billion; sale of F-16 combat aircraft to Venezuela.
- Covert arms sales to movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua.
- In Afghanistan, US aided with \$2 billion in weapons and training to mujahadin dedicated to ousting Soviet occupiers.



# **‘Iran/Contra affair’**

- Arms scandal of 1980s was Iran/Contra affair, in which Reagan administration bartered arms with Iran to raise funds to arm anti-government Contra militia force in Nicaragua.
- The operation violated Congressional ban on aid to Contras.
- The operation was revealed to public after operative involved in delivering weapons via air, was captured by Sandinista government.

# Post-Cold War dynamics

- With end of Cold War, economic motives moved to forefront in Bush/Clinton years in arms sales, which explicitly tied arms exports with support to defense industry.
- Embarrassing development of Bush/Clinton years was revelation that USA/western allies were supplied arms to Iraq in the run-up to 1991 Gulf War.
- Establishment of UN Arms Register, a voluntary system of reporting arms exports and imports.

# Post-9/11 arms exports

- In the name of fighting ‘War on Terror’, Bush administration lifted human rights and nonproliferation restrictions on sales to allies in fighting terrorism.
- By 2006 such sales had doubled, from about \$10 billion per year to over \$20 billion.
- Major drivers of the increase in the arms market included sales to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Israel.

# Trade in Small arms and light weapons (SALW)

- Small arms: revolvers, pistols, rifles, carbines, assault rifles, submachine-guns, light machine-guns.
- Light weapons: heavy machine-guns, handheld under barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems, mortars of less than 100mm calibre.

# SALW in numbers

- There are 639 million SALW in the world.
- Most of small arms are owned by civilians.
- Others are controlled by military forces.
- SALW are often used by rebels, drug gangs.
- There are 70 to 100 million copies of just one type of automatic weapon – AK-47.

# How do non-state groups get their hands on SALW?

1. Theft or purchase from government forces.
2. Taking advantage of lax local gun laws.
3. Illegal, clandestine sales (black market).

# Dual use: A.Q. Khan network

- One model for how nuclear black market operates is smuggling network established by A.Q. Khan.
- Khan is known as the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb.
- Using plans he developed while working at a nuclear facility in Europe along with support from Pakistani government, Khan built a vast centrifuge facility at Kahuta, near Islamabad.

# Dual use: A.Q. Khan network - 2

- By 1984, Khan completed work on a nuclear bomb.
- He took advantage of weak export controls and loopholes in national and international regulations that focused on plants and complete systems rather than components.
- Then, Khan 'reversed the network' he had developed, to disseminate nuclear know-how and plans throughout the world.



# Dual use: A.Q. Khan network - 3

- Nuclear components would be manufactured in one, shipped through a second country, assembled in a third and designated for use in a fourth.
- The network included suppliers from: Switzerland, UK, UAE, Turkey, South Africa, Malaysia.
- It transferred nuclear weapons-related technology, centrifuge parts and blueprints to Iran, North Korea, Libya.

# Dual use: A.Q. Khan network - 4

- A.Q. Khan oversaw 'WalMart of private sector proliferation'.
- Khan was dismissed later from his post in 2004 and was put in house arrest.
- Khan's network did not function wholly independently; he had support from Pakistani military and civilian nuclear establishment.

# Prospects for restraint

- Conventional Arms Transfer talks between US and USSR ended in failure.
- 2001 UN Conference on SALW produced programme of action calling on states to undertake voluntary efforts to institute better internal controls on export of SALW.
- There are separate initiatives to curb trade in 'conflict diamonds' and natural resources traded as source of revenue for buying SALW.

# Prospects for restraint - 2

- Arms Trade Treaty, entered into force in 2014.
- ATT sets standards for denying sales based on violations of human rights, enforcement of existing embargoes, and destabilizing supplies to areas of conflict.

# NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

# Introduction

- Nuclear weapons appeared in 1945.
- They emerged as guarantors of international peace and security during the Cold War.
- Possession or protection under the umbrella of nuclear weapons was regarded as one of factors of relative peace and stability in the international system.
- Today, possession of nuclear weapons remains fundamental basis for world order.

# NPT

- Since 1 July 1968 when negotiations of nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) were completed, there has been desire to prevent new states from acquiring nuclear weapons and to curb the buildup of nuclear weapons among possessor states.
- Thus, NPT has the task of preventing proliferation and disarming the very weapons.

# Ineffectiveness of NPT

- NPT has been far from effective in the objective of preventing proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons. Proof?
- Current global nuclear arsenal of over 27000 weapons.
- Increase in the number of states known to possess nuclear weapons from five in 1968 to nine in 2007 (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea).



# Effectiveness of NPT

- NPT has been relatively effective in curbing proliferation. Evidence?
- Dramatic decline in number of nuclear weapons from 80,000 in 1980s to 27000.
- 4 new states acquired nuclear weapons instead of some 20 states as predicted.
- Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, did not pursue a nuclear weapons despite having capacities.

# Effectiveness of NPT - 2

- Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Poland, Romania, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Libya which had nuclear weapons programs abandoned them.
- NPT is more successful in preventing new states from acquiring weapons than it has been in disarming existing nuclear states.
- Latter objective is unlikely given the interest of nuclear states in maintaining the status quo.

# Types of proliferation

- Vertical: qualitative and quantitative improvement in the arsenals of states that already possess nuclear weapons.
- Horizontal: the quest of new states to acquire nuclear weapons.

# Non-proliferation regime

- NPT is linchpin of non-proliferation regime.
- Other elements of the regime: Partial Test Ban Treaty; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I, II; Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I, II, III; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty; Nuclear Suppliers Group; Missile Technology Control Regime; International Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.

# Three challenges: challenge by nuclear states

- There is the challenge posed by states within nonproliferation regime (North Korea, USA, Russia, which are seeking to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons).
- There are no accurate figures for total number of nuclear weapons.
- While there was cuts in arsenals, lack of transparency makes very difficult to assess accurately whether reductions are complete, verifiable and irreversible.

# Three challenges: challenge by nuclear states - 2

- Five nuclear weapons states are nowhere near meeting their disarmament commitments under NPT.
- They have decreased their arsenal, but continue to upgrade their weapons system.
- Reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.

# Three challenges: challenge by de facto nuclear states

- Challenge comes from India, Israel, Pakistan which did not sign NPT; from China, North Korea, Egypt, Iran, Israel, USA, which need to ratify CTBT.
- Israel/Pakistan: their desire to stay outside of nonproliferation regime were driven by security concerns.
- India: due to security concerns and due to acquire a prominent seat in determining world affairs.

# Three challenges: challenge by de facto nuclear states - 2

- North Korea: It withdrew from NPT; stayed out of CTBT, due to security concerns after Cold War when it lost protection of Soviet Union and felt threatened by USA.
- Presence of nuclear states outside non-proliferation regime poses unique challenge.
- Can the regime make non-members comply with the norms of the treaties even if they are not legally bound?



# Three challenges: challenge from non-state actors

- Challenge coming from non-state actors (Aum Shinrikyo, al-Qaeda) that have tried to own nuclear weapons or to sell their expertise and materials (Dr A.Q. Khan). Khan's threat:
- First, inability of Pakistan to control its nuclear establishment.
- Second, states seeking nuclear arsenal have access to network for acquiring weapons technology.
- Third, armed groups might receive know-how.

# Three characteristics of use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors

1. So far WMD were used by national non-state actors. E.g. Rajneesh group's attack in Oregon, Aum Shinrikyo's in Tokyo, Amerithrax in USA.
2. Casualties caused by use of WMD by non-state actors were minimal: Rajneesh - 751 people affected by salmonella poisoning, no deaths; Aum Shinrikyo - affected 5000 people, 12 deaths; Amerithrax - 22 people affected, 5 deaths.
3. So far there has been no known case of nuclear terrorism.

# Missiles and nuclear weapons

- All nuclear weapons states possess missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
- Ballistic missile: weapon-delivery vehicle that has ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path.
- Cruise missile: weapon-delivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path.
- Not all ballistic and cruise missile possessing states have nuclear weapons.

# Making of nuclear weapons

- All nuclear weapons are made out of fissile materials: plutonium-239 and uranium-235.
- Natural uranium comprises about 99.3% of uranium-238 and 0.7% of uranium-235.
- For the purposes of making nuclear weapons this natural uranium is 'enriched' so that it comprises 90% of uranium-235 isotope.
- About 15-25 kg of highly enriched uranium is required to make one nuclear bomb.

# Making of nuclear weapons - 2

- Plutonium-239 is a man-made element and by-product of burning uranium-238.
- 6-8 kg of plutonium enough for a bomb.
- The explosive power of nuclear weapons is based on either splitting atoms through a process called 'fission' or combining atoms through a process called 'fusion'.

# Making of nuclear weapons - 3

- 'Fission' is possible only with fissile material, such as plutonium-239 and uranium-235.
- 'Fusion' requires light atoms with very small mass, such as deuterium/tritium; 'fusion' bomb is also called a hydrogen bomb or a thermonuclear bomb.
- Over 2,000 nuclear tests carried out.
- Nuclear weapons not used since 1945 when USA dropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima and a plutonium weapon on Nagasaki in Aug 1945.

# Three approaches to address the challenges

- 1<sup>st</sup> approach - Multilateral institutional approach anchored in treaty-based regimes, such as NPT (1968).
- Such treaties are not amenable to amendments to adjust to the new realities.
- These treaties are weak on enforcement.

# Three approaches to address the challenges - 2

- 2<sup>nd</sup> approach – non treaty based multilateral approaches (declarations/resolutions by UNSC/UNGA; UN Special Commission to disarm Iraq's WMD programs).
- 3<sup>rd</sup> approach - ad hoc, non-institutional, approaches led by individual states or a group of states (US-led Proliferation Security Initiative; EU3's negotiations with Iran; six-party talks to address North Korea's nuclear ambitions; Indo–US civilian nuclear initiative).



# PRIVATE SECURITY

# Introduction

- Control, sanctioning and use of violence traditionally fell to states.
- When USA invaded Iraq in 2003, 1 out of every 10 soldiers were employed by private security companies (PSCs).
- They delivered services (logistics, training) that used to be done by military personnel.

# Increasing demand for private security services

- PSCs now provide more kinds of services.
- Changes in nature of armed conflicts led tasks less central to militaries to be subcontracted to PSCs.
- States are not the only organizations that hire security providers: non-state actors (NGOs, multinational corporations) finance security services.

# Private security and the control of force

- Private security may affect how and whether people can control violence.
- Does the privatization of security undermine state control of violence?
- Pessimists claim that the turn to private security threatens to undermine state control and democratic processes.

# Private security and the control of force - 2

- Consequences of privatizing security can be severe in weak states.
- Unregulated private armies linked to international business interests threaten to undermine democracy and development.
- Optimists declare that private options offer solutions to security problems.

# Private security and the control of force - 3

- When considering the effects of privatization of security, it is important to consider the context.
- Another is capacities of states: strong states are best able to manage the risks of privatization; weak states are least able to manage private forces for the public good.

# **A transnational market for military and security services**

- Every UN peace operation conducted since 1990s include presence of PSCs.
- Companies such as Shell hire PSCs to guard personnel and installations.
- Private firms train militaries.
- Estimates suggest that 2003 global revenue for this industry was over US\$100 billion.

# Classifying private security companies

- Examples of firms in USA: MPRI, BoozAllen&Hamilton; in UK: ArmorGroup.
- ArmorGroup, formerly British then American, works for private businesses, INGOs, states.
- It provided security to UN mission in former Yugoslavia (1992-1995); worked for clients such as Bechtel, BP, De Beers, Shell, Mobile, Amoco, Chevron, CARE.



# What kinds of services do these firms provide?

- PSCs offer three categories of external security: operational support, military advice & training, and logistical support.
- PSCs also offer internal security: site security, crime prevention and intelligence.
- PSCs also offer operational support: command&control, transport.

# **Role of market in security services before Westphalia**

- Markets for allocating violence were common before Westphalian system of states came to dominate.
- Feudal lords supplemented their forces with contracted labor from 12<sup>th</sup> century through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when force was allocated through the market.
- Also, the rise of the state did not immediately preclude the market allocation of violence.

# **Role of market in security services after Westphalia**

- Early modern states delegated control over force to firms and participated in the market as suppliers and purchasers.
- Chartered companies such as East India Company, acted as army and police force for establishing order and then protecting trade routes and new territory.
- Also, states rented out their forces to other friendly states.

# Growing supply

- The increase in private security can be tied to supply and demand.
- In 1990s, supply factors came from local (end of apartheid in South Africa) and international (end of Cold War) that caused militaries to be downsized in late 1980s and 1990s.
- Military downsizing led to experienced personnel available for contracting.

# Growing demand

- Downsizing of militaries took place in ideological context where liberal capitalist ideas were in the ascendancy.
- Ideas about benefits of privatization were endorsed widely.
- Appeal of privatization ideas led people to see private alternatives as obvious and affected the growth of private supply.

# Growing demand - 2

- End of Cold War leading to smaller scale conflicts unleashed disorder and demands for intervention.
- PSCs provided tool for meeting demands.
- PSCs provided tools for weak governments in the Eastern bloc and the developing world to shore up their capabilities.

# Conclusion

- The market undermines the monopoly of the state over violence in world politics.
- Using market advantages executives relative to legislatures, reduces transparency.
- Use of market involves the private sector in decision-making - giving those with commercial interests in policy influence.
- The market option makes it easier to undertake adventurous foreign policies.

# Readings for this lesson:

## Must readings:

Williams, pages: 345-374.

## Optional:

Williams, pages: 438-451.